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AfiSTRA(:T 
Secure information disrribution is a strategic capability significant 
weapons systems alld tactics to military operations_ Tile Depanment or Defense has 
recognized the im1X'rtance of establishins and maintaining secure distribukd 
communications bet\.\'een ;Illtomated information systems_ This research reviev,,-s 
eleven different distrihutcd file systems and explores the practicality and 
applicability of om:: slIch systelll, Tmstecl Ficus File System (THUI-'FI J-:S), in tile 
DoD infrastructure_ lnwgrated into this rcsearch arc discussions of Privacy 
Enhanced Mail (PEM), which is cUTTently' an integral part of the TRUfFLES 
implementation_ This thesis concludes with a discussion of the actual installation 
of a PENt reference implementation, and future reqllirements for the TRUH'LES 
installation at the "laval Postgraduate School. 
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SOGrce o f growth is the increased ot op e n compc:ter s ys tems 
b a sed o n t he UN I X) standard . '; 
Novembe r 16, 1 990 , the Secret a ry of De fense di r ected 
lhe i mp leme ntat i on o f t he 000 Corporate In f o:::'rna l ion M.anagement 
(C Ig ) .initi ative . Some of th e obj e ct i 'Jes o f th e CH1 i r:it. i a r.ive 
t o i:npr ove p orta::Ji l.i t y, i nter - o;Jerabi l i t y, 
lndependence a:ld sec ur i ty o f DoD information syste ms and 
a rchit ectures . Jl. key e lemen t t o t h e in it.iative is in lhe 
imp l e mentation o f ,v ide area computing and dev e l opment c f a 
cormnunications inf r ast.rc:ctur e which ,,61 1 sc:ppor t t.h ese 
ODJ e ct l ves . 
,-lil h t h e '::'ise in feder a.l spe nr..ing on compu t er sys t ems and 
lnt.e:::' - connect l.on, cl e ar l y an i n creased emprlas i s is being 
p l aced on informa t ion secu:city c l assif i ca tion, distr i bu t ed 
c ommunicat.ions, fi l e si"larin g and r.epl i ca t ion syst.ems, an d in 
the in f rc.o-.lrucl u Te n e cessCiry f or. secure cor:Lrm:n.icat i on of 
info.::"mil t. ion shared b e tween syslems . Lar;w amounts o f tsx t ua l 
ilnd non - t e xt.l,al data must b e t r.a n sf e rred in a secu re mann e r 
and wit_h the s ame ' user e a se" 8f l ogging onto and t ransfe rr.ing 
informat io;:) t il r.C l:gh t ypical cO:n:(m:nica t i ons network 
electronic mai l sys t em. 
operatino- sy s t e m d e ve lo:.;e d a nd 'r"de'~rked 
a pun on th e t-Ll1t lc s s y st em , 
t;'le 196 03. 
'Kel l ner, "Da t a POl-.'er " Au gust 
:99J 
Currently, th e :::e e: re several systems under developmeLC : 0::: 
~ he 
t h e secu r e transporl of dat a , c:-tE' a c: then t_i cation o f 
fil e s h"ring ann repl:l_cation. Thes e 
sy ;;t: e ms gene ra lly fa ~=- H1C:O one o f ca :: egor i e s : applica t i on 
or s o f t ",,-are f i le s:: r uc t u ::es .,.;h ich c, ~~ i l iz es cryp tology t o:: 
encod i nq he ja::a prio r to t r ansm i ss i on; and app l lca t ion 
sof::",;are/ h a rdl,'a r e " p i r e ',vall " t ype systems which a:::e sepa :::at e c 
t ram ::he and act as a out of 
individual~y 2dmi n i s:: erej ccmp ut er networ!';: sy~ t em. 
THE BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 
This resea rch ", ,i l l r ev ie-,,' dl: f e r~'n:_ dis:_rib u ted fi l e 
sY2>-ems and explore c: he p ra c:: lcality an d arp l ira bil .ity of on e 
such syslern in a DoD i nf r as :: r uc :: ure . 
Lur t.h e T e xp l ai:1 an d ampllf:i this research quest i on 
1 ,tillat is a Se cure Oistribu ~_ ed fi l e Sys em? 
B" DISCUSSION OF THE BAS IC RES EARCH QUESTI ONS 
The rese2.rch I" i l l 2.1so l ook at the definit. ior-:,s ar-:,d t.ern-.s 
used, er,crypt i on methodologies f or au then tiCc t ion, 
secur i ty reQu i rerren t s 0: a secure e l ectronic distri:::u tec file 
transfer system ove r COZilnon (unt.rust.ed} lines Systems 
considered are th e S un Ne t wo r k Fi le System (NI'S) , the Andre'",' 
fil e syo;tem , th e Coce. F:il (~ System, the Apoll o Lomain F i l e 
u~mFS), ~he AT&'T Remot(-, r :i1e Shc~ ring SySt e m (RFSI, the 
Sprit e Netwo r k Fi l R System (SNFS) IBM AIX Di s~ri::::u t. e(~ 
Services, ~he Locus Operating Sys:em, Project Athena Gnd 
::he F i cus Fil e SYCi::err. aLc t he 'Trusted Files Ficu s 
('TRUFFLES) . The paper conc l uces '",itn a of 
the se l ection of one of :hese systems, T-'<.'J?FLES, for 
H:corporation in :: o a LoD infras~ructure_ Also discussec Gre 
aLising from t he aC:Llal impl(cmen:c.tion o f Pr i vacy 
Enhancec. Mail a nd fur:h ceL i rr,plementa~i.on requirf"'men rs f or 
TR"_TFFLES at t he NGval ?ostgraduate School . 
Sec lJ.:-e electroni c large vol,.,me dis t r i bli ~ed f i l e - vansEer 
cu:-:-ent ly development inco:-po::: ar_e a -,.,ic e means 
o f ensuring data secur i ty and a ;lthent i ci ty 
the f~ rs t t.wo research q ueSL l.OnS; 
d ~ st::: i blitec fl l e SystE)1'., and ;::he qualitie5 a.nC: 
technologies ~houlc ~ave f or 
i ncorporation in l o the struct 'J.re of th e DoD. Background 
1.r.E orrLation present ed h e r e f or r eference into c '~ rrent 
trends dnd p rocecbre s Hl t.he development of the 
DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS 
In genera l , a f ile syst eJ1l is compos e d 0: a port ion of t he 
compliters operat ~ ng :unct_ i e n i ~" to 
r etr i eve cat.a from a st o rage medLrn, uS~la l ly a dl.sk c r tape 
dr i ve . . r.,. dl.st::ibu "-e d f~ le sys~_erL a llo-,.,s fo r t he sharing or 
repl ica t l. on e l ectronic f i l es over a. n e t _'.vork. A secure 
c.istr l. buted file system incorporates an end ;::0 
sclleme for ~he cia- t_a '.>Ihile ie t he transf er 
A d i s t :::ibut ed 
r e l ated fun ctional CODpol:ents a set of connectej 
COmF.lter sys t el".c;; . It provl.des fo r rR~iaJ::;i' ity from t.he of 
::Iult iple :::O!Fpone nts :Co:::at ed l.n many ",r e as; e fficiency in data 
3.ccess and overa l l system r esponse time; flexi:O ili ty i n the 
incremen t al upsc3.1ing of compu ting power by Ule uti li 'G at j on ot: 
coord~nating 11'.oder3. te s u :ed compu t er systems. 
'Typical l y , distri;Juted file sysLems [unc~ i ona l :i ty resijee;; 
i n the appl~cation or pree;; e nt2.t ~ on l a y e r of the OSI s even 
layer p r o t ocol. re f e rence mode l .'· ,/>.. p rotocol is a farIna l 
des cr i ption of a message f orma t. and the corrmun i c a tion ruJ8s 
t he conne cted computer s must. follo"</ i n c r de r to cxc h omge O3. til. 
They d es cr i be al l det ai l s c f the machi ne i Eteifaces frem the 
Im'/er p hys i cal l evel t o the top or app l i cat i c n leve l . 
':li t hin the ::: n teTnet, a m3.Jo rity of da t a a cces e;; ilnd 
t:!:"ansfe r i s L"1rough Pile Transfer Protoco l (FT F ). :;: n a GDre 
tightl y c on figur ed in tegra t.ec. c omp ut ing en'vironrnen t , 
Net\'lOrk ?il c Sye;;tem is predcminantly 
SECURI TY AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES 
':'his d iscusses cOllceTn ~ng 
informotion t.rons:er erea networke;;, Di e;; cretionory 
Conlro l e;; (DAC s) f or o;;u c h d. n e tl<.'ork ilnd Do:J specific 
standarcs on l evels 0: infOl::Tnation e;;ecu rity . 
to r Ccmputer 
159 
• STJ'..C KS Today' s 
P:!:" e nt ':" ce 
The Department 0 : D(·~t (>n sf" Standard Tru s t ed System 
Eval·.lat i on C:-iteria 10::>0 52 (10 . 28-S':'DI s tates thaT;: 
di s:::u s s i ::>n of cOIFj::uter security necessar i l y sta r t s 
sta c. ement of r equiremen t s. I n genera_, s ectl re sys t ems ",il l 
cO:ltrol ,:f or:T'ati::> n s uc h l bat on l y properly 
aur. horized i ndividuals ''''il l :ldve (0 read , "nit e, creel t e 
0::: delete in fo rma t ion. , f I t : u rther c l a ri fie s tha t there =n:(~ 
rU::1ddmen(a l requirerr.en ts derived f r om ( his 
sta t erne:lt: fcu:;:- at ',-Jhich provide cO:ltr:-ol to informati::>n 
a:'ld prul.'ide credita~le inforrnation 
In t: o n r,ation st' c urJ. ty art' divide c four 
,isions: A , B, C, one. =.I. Division A is a pp l ied 
cons i dered the lu>">'e c-, r. security lev e l; almost a:'lY c omputer 
at the lowe's t l evf" ] :no and 
h i gher d~v i ,", i cna l rati::1gs as h ard-,,'are o r sof t",-'are 
compcne:'lts a J:"e J:lccr:;.JorateC TtLi s provides d method for 
me asuJ:"~ng an increased leve_ o f conf i c f" nc ;:, fC l": cl1e p r o tection 
o f mere 3ellsit~ve in f ormation . \\lithi:l d i v is ions B a:le. Care 
clds s sub6.ivisio:'13Whi c h are also ranked i n a r.ie rarchi c a .l 
generally pertain to hardware and 
scfl'vldre SYStem3 and informat ion p 03sessed 0:1 ttle 
cO<1"puler system Evaluat io~l c y 
No. 522S , 7 l 1 Dc·'cemher ~9 85. 
machin e _ Genera] security in:orIna tion divisions (da t a,1 a re 
b ro k e n i nto the follO'.-.' i ng levels : 
Level 1 data for classified or secure info rmaL ion . 
Level 2 daL a fo y- informat :.on ',,'hi ch is unclassi.: i ed but 
considered sensitivt' . 
Level :01' unclassl~_ ied and non-sensltlve 
in fcrma t lon 
Di sc-;::"etionary Ccnt rc ls (DAC's) are a methcd of 
rescrlct l ng to t i les .cased o n the identity of th e us e r 
and are t h e In:;>st cormnon contro l methods us e d in trust ed 
."'- If'0jorily cf the information Se n t e l ect:::":;nic means 
a rp 0 : da t a spcurity leve ls 2 or ~. "equire l'lent guidelines for 
t his level o f informa t ion dn Or0nge Eook. secur i ty 
l ev e l 0 : C2 Bl 'C a n d a rt' :'..n speci fic realms cf : 
establishing the 
the lS '.",ho 
t hos e 
prOt ect 
by a th :. rd party· a di :[eLence b e t wppn 
COCTIwncanoo, pdt~ 
resistant t.O 
1. Definition of Threats a n d Vu l n e r abilities; Security 
Versus Ease of Use 
'tii t h t he deT:'.ands ::m time l y i n tormatJ. o n and 
t he gr eater VCLumes o f i Il f ormat i ·::m be i ng prc cessed, 
p r ot e c t i on and rpplication b ecomes a Da j o r securily 
COrl9rel:e;~ sive i n :orlTblion resou rce protec LJ.. on p r o cedures must 
address, at a mi n imum , the accounl ",bi ~ ity 0: the in f ormation 
and t h e u sers i nvo I ved data and h ard>'-"iO.L e !so : t-,,'cn:e 
::::cE t rols. The greater va lue o t informa t ion process e d, t]-,e 
grea t er the c onseque n ces f OL :.ts u na u thori z e :i an d 
t h e r e f ore , th e greateL the need of con t r ol r"ea s u::::es to 
p r ctect ed i t . ' 
ass umr:;t l o n of ten abou t thr e als a n d 
vu lnera bil l l i es are t hat t h ey o.re sPparate di s t i r.ct 
o r t h a t they are attached t o a s o l e tech n icd l 
pr:JCess. I' Fo :: t he p;..; rpose of th is paper, a threat i s 
ar;yt :!1i ng wh i ch can be perceived 
i nf8rmat i on sys tem. Thre at. s 
ca tcqo ries: Pas sive and Act ive . 
a possib l e daYlger to the 
he broken dov-m int o n"c 
. ::... Pass i ve t.hreat i nvolves the in t ercepti on but n8t t.he 
a l teration of in f orrnatior.:. ':'he danger o f the paSSlve threat is 
t-he u!1knm·m comp::-cmise oE s ens iliv e in fu r:nalicn . 
lIn Activ e t h::-eat- involves t he intercept ion and 
aller"tion of informat.ioll act i ve threat-'s prima r y danger 
is i n the f.al si fied au t-he!1t- icity o f the in f orrr,ation 
I n cOIltr-ast-, a vulllerabil i ty is a ",,,eakness ill a 
computer s y stem w!"',e re i t is s'Jscei,ltiD l e tc atta.ck and can be 
deliberately exploited to vio l ate systerr security . A tr,reat. to 
an inf.8rrr.ation system '",ill ey.ploit t ~e vu l ne r abi l ity o f that 
sys t em, v i o l at i l'.g the integrity and s e c'Jr.ity of ,:J --',at 
I I""! genera l , the more secu r e a system, th e l ess "\::ser 
f rjend l y " thal system beccmes . ,\ .. hile securlty ::neasures are 
i mp8rtant, procedures or cievices 'dhich a::::e not. ;Jrac lica l or 
cu:nbersome ar e o f ten circ'J:nven t ed by l e qit l mat e use rs in crder 
'::0 co:nplet. e an a ss igned job. 3eca'Jse o f t hi~ hum;:mistic 
10 
fee ~ ure, usableness or ' user friendliness" becomes .:\.~ 
extrc ::!e l y i:nportanl b:..l~ of;:'en overlooked security f ealure. 
2. Incorporation Into the Existing Network Struc ture; 
GOSIP, X.40 0 , X . SOO, X.S09 
Startl.ng i n 1')90 . Government agencies whid1 required 
computer networking products were requ:".ed to buy systems 
which conformed to a standard set of Government OS: protocols 
(GOS:P ) This collection of protocols was sponsored by the 
National Institute of SLandards Tech!1ology (NIST) and is Lhe 
United States government's subset version of international OS ! 
standards . :n the United States the GOSIP pro f ile is as 
follows : 
C= l.ogioalLinkCoolrOl 
I CSMA/~ Q Okm OIlS [ Token Ring 
I Basdud I Broadband . TWiwrlPlLirJ 
Figure 1. Government OSI Protocols (GOS I P) 
:'A"O:"iO , F .M R",:-.um,M . . :.'" . , " 1\ Network Perimeter v,:" th 
Secure ExteL.cll J'..cces ::;" . Trus":ed InformaLion Systems, Inc, 
January 25, 1 994 
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I t requi r es t h e File 'T'rans f er, Access and Manageme:-'.t 
protoco l :' (F'T'AM) tor flle access services and X. 4 0 0 pru t ocol 
: ;) r messag~Ilg serv~ces. 
The F"TAt-1 protoco l is (:oIlsidcred syst en;atically cUIT,r lex 
2Ild provides c.. uni f ied s tructur e f or t h e f ol l O\"l i ng area s · 
v J.rtual fi l e store de f initions, file se.::·v~ce definit~ons and 
s uptlor t ing f:i.le pco t oco l spec i f icatiuns. ' s 
'Tn p. vi r tual filest o .te definition por t i on of FTl'J.: 
p:-cvides fo.::· a comp r ehens i ve struc t ured def inition of fi l e 
presentations, do.ta trans fe r a n d i den t ification. The 
f il e service definit i on portion al lc'ds for a struc t ured 
de f ini~iun of services avai lab l e Lo u sers and establlS[l.es user 
aut h crity or p r i vileges t.o and manipulate f iles . The 
f i le p ru t oco l specifica t ions of FTAM p"Cov i d e direct support by 
ass i gn ing "one to one " marp i n g of serv i ce appllcatlons to 
spe ci f i c data pcints . The protoco l esL~bl l shes a sess ion 
connect i on and il1 10-.-..'s Lcr t he flow of data through sp p. ci f i e d 
'checkpoi.nts" 
X.'l DO is an Int erna '... ional COIlsultive CCITLLlitt.ee for 
Te legraphy and Teleph :lrly (CeITI) s ta ndar d and an I nt ernatioI~al 
Standards Orga.ni zation (ISO) prc t occ l fo :::- message handling 
and i s being accepted as a star.da r d :cr st.or-e 
fO ri-la r d riles sage de l ive r y. I n TJN I X, IT,ess:oge hand l i n g i. s done by 
12 
UNI X-t:::> - l]NIX Copy F:::-8gram (UUCP) l\ and in Transmission 
Ce n:: rel P:::-o ~" co l / In t ernet Prot ocol ('T'C P/IP) simp l e :1a i l 
i s the protoco l '",hich co n n e c t s 
Lo g ether i nt:::> one g e n era l message handli :1J 
s y s t em . v e n d e r s have i n their syst ems 
\<.'hich translate ad::iresses and me55ag e :onnats i nto a n 
appropriat e forms t foe f..he t ar]et sys t ems . lIS a res u l t, 
gate-,,'ay s yst ems a::-e becoming wi::iespred d. ,~ 
X . 500 i s a CC I TT" s ta nd:nd p ro tecel f e t" de:ining 
dJ.rectory i nf erma t ion snd is a CC l '!·'" stan::iard di rectory 
for es :.ab .l. i s hi n g a n a u. t h e nticalion frame work. 
gen e rally used i n conj u nction 11i th X.4 0C and p rovldes fo r a 
g loba l directery tor u se in OSI This a llov.'s fo r 
name sea r ches b a sed on a stric t 
h lerarchy which a s sumes each adminis t r a live domain provid es 
i nfeema t i on :m its members . 
ASYMMETRIC AND SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 
8enerally, l·,,'o lY:;:Jes 0: crypr.ographic sys t ems are u.s e d for 
n et'A'o e k se ::urity: key s y:nme trlC systems a n d 
public/priva t e :.::: e y c t" asyrrunet r ic s y st e ms. I n syrrunetr i c 
cryp t ography, the enciphering and decipller·ing are us ually 
i s the standacd UNI X uti li::y us e d to exc ha ng e 
bet·"'E:en a ny two UNIX nodes . 
>Ialamud, Ca:::: l , 
Ne L',·lorko:: " 
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:he same a;ld must be transmi : ted from -he s e nd e r to the 
form o f 
co:> f ider.t ia l i : '( ~n:egrity . 
The Da ta Encryption Standard (DES) is the algori t hm most 
ut i l ized ~n sy:nmetric c ryptogra phy in th E' tinit e d S t ate s . J:t 
uses a key leng th of 55 bits and has been reco:rll'nen d ed for use 
by non mili tary government agencies. The DES algori t hm hc~ s 
~een considered effective. A smal l change 1n the p l ain tex t 
message prcduces a large ch0.nge in the cipher tex l (kno',,-n as 
lhe avalanc:1e effect) and e xhiblts a strong compllmentary 
property b etween the p l ain texl, cipher lext, and key. 
HUde\rer , it ha s ~-ecently co:ne unde~ the 
o f the 55 bit key l ength Illany as 
being sma ll . The a dva nceme nt of compu ter techno logy in 
produc i ng i n creasingly sophisticated mi croprocessors a t a 
-'- Ol-Ier cost legi t imizes the clain t.hat the key could b e 
decipr,ered by e i :::r,er a spec i al purpose machin e via "brute 
f orce " '.lsinq a tab l e look up approach. l $ 
1 : 1 asyrr.metric c ryptography t he enc ip;""lering and deciphering 
keys are r e la ted mat herr.at ica lly jut are cons'--dered to be 
com;>utati c na l l y infe asible dec ipher one frem the other; 
tr.ere f ore , on,c k ey f er encipr,ering) co.n oe made p u bli c 
a nd the deci;>hering key is kept prlvatE' 'This typ E' of 
avo i ds the r.ec e 5Slty of tra nsmitting a seCllre key 
Compu t er 
;>9 SO. 
untrust ed :nediul11 and can to tra nsmit a secure key o f 
a syrr.:netr~c 
The cO:lcept o[ aSYIThL1et-ric cryptography is t he fol l oHi!!g ' 
" 30b" encrypts a usi n J the public o f and 
t h en sends the message t o over an UEtrusted ch3nne l . 
On l y Alice decrypt the messa"e since she :i s t .he only cne 
who her priva te key. 
In the above · .... ·ere Lo "sign ' t'he 
'with h is prlvate ke y Alice cOlll d CeColJIl i zC 8cb's 
S .Lgnature ','lith hlS public key In t.his si t uation , asym:net.ri ca l 
systems [or the u t i liza t ion of digital siga3tures . 
'The alg-ori t l-:rn used in mos t publlc/pr i vate key cLypt8 - systems 
the RSA 81' Rivest Sharr:i r Adlem:3.n a l goritr,-,11 . 
DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS 
."'- Digiti'l l Signat. ure is a bi t a t tached 
e l e ctronic document is_ geaerated by a signee and 
base d cr_ he>th the docUIPt'n,. th e indi V.Lduai ' s secret 
Anyone who :::-ec e ~ ves the docwnent can l e gally pr8ve 
the s i gnee o f th e document inon-repudiation l a nd w:'1ether i l 
\-.'as a l t ered. ' 
"- E" , __ , . (1--11; 
"- [{ITt 
Bruce, "Di git-.o. l 
pg 309. 
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and r e ce i v ed then 
3 YTE l'lago.zine, 
J'.. digi t a l s ignature i s useE'-l l for man y reasons . FJ.rst, it 
i s net forgeab l e and as p roof to the rec i pien t thal the 
sJ.]ner de liberately sigTled the e l ec tronic docunent. Second , 
t.he signa.t ure i s not. reusable and part uf the d OC'.lrflent It 
c annot be> t.ran sf e rreC to a different docune nt.. Fina lly , once 
the COC1.lD.ent is una l t erabl e a nd t h e signa tur e> cannot. 
be r ey ud i atec. 
Digi ta l s i gnat u res are use:': LO de t ect unauthor i z ed 
mccifica.tions t o odta d n d to au th e ntica t e t h e ident ity of the 
s i g nuto ry I n add i tion, th e recipi ent. can lise th e d i gita l 
SJ.9na t ure tc p rove third poo:rty t ha t the s ::'gnature \-Ia s 
gene r ated by th e sJ.gnator y i n a :met hoc k:lc\-m a 0:; non-
re:;JUdiat i on . ?1 
Asymrnet.r i c o r ;:Jubl i c Key cTY;:J t ography is u sed fer digital 
s l.gnatures. The NI ST s ta;-~da rd cryptc l ogieal me t hou is the 
Di g i tal S J.. gnature Algor i r.hm (DSA) . Pu blic Key cryptography 
the :JSJ'.. encl'yplion '''' it h t"<,'o dif feren t keys, t h e -public 
v,hieh are know:1 t o t~e public in general, a nd p riva t e 
keys w~'1ich are knm·m con ly to t he individual s lg rn ng t:he 
mes s aJe . DS1\ \-li ll enc r ypt the message or file us i n g bo t h 
hO".>iev er . s i g nature Jeneration only be pe rformed by of 
the private k ey. 
Po. ~ash !' ullct ion used in the signature generat io:l 
16 
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-::-eD3.1n in tact for seve::c'al years . ;.:sing a specla l l y designed 
ccmpu::er pa~'al l el p rocessing, a 5 1 2 Ll:: key cOlJ l d 
:heore tlca l ly be c::::acked '-n a I;1a: t er of months. To cou nte-::-
th i s NIS T made the keys va r iabl e between 
which wo ~dd ~_ake seve~'a l hun d :::- e d y e ars to 
: e chnology . i' 
and 10 24 bi:'s, 
The o( a d i gi~_al sign a :uTe is a l so d ependent 
:he wain::enance 8 E secrecy 0: :he \ls e ::c's private k ey. Fo:::: this 
reas:m. c onformance to lhis standa rc. and the use 8 f a digital 
si gna c u r e coes no~_ insure trw t a particul ar implementation is 
secure, but on l y Lhat the dccumf:nt i s s eCD r-e ·,·nth reference t o 
the slgnat u ::c'e c.pplied t o it. Th e responc, i lJ le authority i n e,,"ch 
agency mus~ ensure ~he tha t irrp l ementation 8f d igita l 
s i c;na tu ::- e s p::-ovides f or an accep:abl e lev e l ot sec u rity , and 
~_ ha t t here must b e a binding o f :he identity and the 
user- 's public k ey_ 
Tdh en a signed :nessage i s direc t l y transrr,iltec. frOD a 
sender ::: 0 a rece iver 'tJi thout any arbitrator, i t is ca l l e d a 
tr-ue digita l signat'.1re . Ho\-,ever, if the sender ".'ants t o r e fu t e 
the true signature , he can make his privale encoding s i gn :l:u:::-e 
publ i c an ::' claim i t a forgery . To preve:1t t his, 
arb i trater is results an ac:tltrated Si cital 
signa t ure. ,,;i th this t he and the a~bi t ra t or us e 
a common key to Rocode the me ssage and create the digl t al 
1 2 
s~gna:'u :::: e. If a conf :' i ct ar i ses, Lh en t h e arbi Lrato: 
ve r ~ty au t h en ti c~ ty of the? s i g rw r.u re and l e gally 
", 1 1 d O'-1bt. dlJc hcrsl:ip . 
Ano ther: c:-yptog raph ic c.evi c e under c ons i d e ra t i on i s r.h e 
by the 
f e de r al gov ernmen t. c 1 i p rer i s a crypL og r aphic dev i ce 
i ntend e d to pro tec c pr i vat e c c m;JU t e r cCITJUu n i c a tions whi le 
s t ill a l l c'\" ~g s p ec ific f e d eral gov ern:nent 1 0.'') e n fo::::cement 
to t. h e e n c iphered C:Ollunun iC:dt i on s through t h e 
use o f governme n t ,;.l l y h e ld k eys. :::lipper is ln t end ed. t o r 
enc ry pLing voice c ransmi ssion ".,·[', l l e co. s inil ar dev~ce, t.h e 
Ca ps t one ch i p , '.'i i l l b e us ed to e n c r yp t. d:3. t. a communicaLion s 
The encoding a l go :::: ith.'Tl used i n Cl i pp er Capston e i '3 t h e 
Sk i pjack algori t ~"1m .. ih l Ch dev eloped by the Nat i ona l 
Se c urit.y ;'.g e n cy (NS;'. ;' . It uses 8 0 n i t k eys , I<l i th 32 r ounds o f 
s c r:amb 1 ing C::::S uses 56 b i t keys and 16 roun ds of s cramb l ing ) 
a nd suppo r ts :3.l~ DES Tl'ode s. " 
The Sk i p Jack a l gor itr_-'-r, \<.'as eval u a t.e d i n 1 9 9 3 , b y t. hc 
Eo:l owing i ndividual s : Bric kel: o f San d la Nat i onal 
L~hora to ::l.es , D . Denning of Georgetown Un i versi t y , S . Ke n t of 
BBN ( orrunun ic a t ~c:--. s Corp D . r-iaher o f Tu chlnan of 
Amp e rlE Cor p . The res u lts 
Cl i p per Surruni:l:CY, 
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E . PRIVACY ENHANCED MAIL 
Privacy Enha nced 1-1s.i l (PEv.:) i s an I nternet ':i tancia rd which 
a 11 m~s for me c; sc.g e and authen t i cat ion 
confiden t ia l ity th r-ough elec tronic mail . It uses cry ptograph) c 
techn i Ql..:es to t::revice f o r me ssage i n t e g r ity, o r i yinator 
3.ut hentiealiep. 3.nd confiden tial i t.y . ./\11 pr ivacy enhanc e rr.ents 
are implemen t ed at t he c.]::p1 i cat ien l ayer a n d dre not dependant 
on any e t. her p r ivacy enha n ced feat u re a l a 2o 'tler protocel 
leve l. 
PEf.1 X. 50 9 cert ificat e s t. o a dis t inguis h ed name 
to a n RSA or DS.q Fc;b l ic Key . ;\ di s tingulshed name i s a name 
, ... ,-hi eh unlqllely ] l o bcdly lden t i fiE;s a user. [:, certif i cat i on 
authority v ouches f er t he bindi!lg ef il ci istingui sl!eci name an ci 
the p~b l ic key aSSOclatec. ·with it in the organ i za t i onal ~n i t 
t o '.<ih l c h the name i s attached . Th e distinguishec. n,a me sta tT S 
the orgar, i za t ion' s name o.nd t h e n a t t ache c; some charac t er 
s t ric .. g identJ fi e s the user, g e r.era lly a corrunof'. 

Prj o r to send ing a ll encrypted IT.essage, the sender must 
acqL:i r e the certif i cate fcr each recipie n t a nd va li dat.e them 
oy checkinQ the digi t dl signatL:re associated with each , Onc e 
vdlld~ t ed , the pUDl i c key i s taken f rom the certi f icate und is 
'.1sed to e n crypt t he unique D:o.t a ELcrypti cfl Key {DEK:' 
used t o e n cryp t the message. TJpon r f>c eipt of the message, the 
reclpi e nt uses theJ.r own IT,atheIT.at ically r elated pr i vate key 
decry:rt ehe whi ch then user: to d ec ryp t the message. 
Keying of ?E11 trans::<issions uses a two l evel key 
h i erarchy . F i .::st ure lhe DatCi EncryptiO:l Keys -",hi ch are used 
for encrypt i on of t he ~leSS?1Qe body . In asymrr.etrica l k ey 
t echn i que s, the DEKs are dlso usee. to encryp t t he s igned 
repr:-esen ta tion, or. hash, of the message . A DEK i s uniq'-1e to 
t he rr essCige t ranSlf,itt e o. and ther.e:or:-e no p re-distribution of. 
D"Ks dre r"equired . 
':'he seCO:l::l key need e d is the Interchan:;;e Key (IKs) -'lhich 
is used to encrypt the DEKs for the transmissic n lhe 
me s sage. 'rhe same IK ""il l be u sed by a given or i ginatcr 
knO\>in recipie! lt. (;iv en tho:;' cor.re ct IK, the rec i pient 
:-il:?crypt the transll',it ted DSK, which i n tu rn i s us e d to dec:rypt 
t he If,e ssage body (S ee A?PEND I X 3 fer. sam:rle PEM rr,essagej . 
If SYlf:lnet r l C cryI;tog r aphy used for. the 
t rd nsmi ssioIl, thpn th e I K is a si n g l e ,,:ey used by both thp 
sende -::- ;;,.nei Tl1i s key will eIlc:ryp t. both t h e DEi< a nd 
thp message Dody . I : asym:-r.e trico.l c ryptography is used, Lhe 
IK is t he pu:O l ic key of the rec:ipip.nt and is usp.d t o encryp t 
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t~e The IK Cls e d t_~-, e ncrypt the mess a ge boc.y i s - h e 
privat e key 8 t the sende r 
lmpl emen t a ti or, s of PEX a v a il a bl e, 
1. Trusted Information System's - Privacy Enhanced Mail 
(TIS/PEM) 
Tr-.l sted :nformat i on In c . (T:Sj, In c08perat::.on 
sec uri ty I nc. a nd ARPA sponsor s hi p have 
-implementation of prlvCl CY enr,anced mail 
called TIS/PEl1 . 
TIS / PEM CU.t he n tlca t1 8n is don e RSA j::Clb l i c key 
crypto<,)raplly a nd use s the Data St a nda r d ( DE S) . The 
message i s e nc r yp te d els i n:] ::he k ey , '.vhl.ch 
encrypted by the p ubl ic key o f ~_ h e Ieceiver and c:. hash 0: the 
by the k e y of t he s ender '['h e 
rece iver h is pr i vate key to decrypt the DE S k ey . \"h i ch i s 
t " .:;n to decr}'pt ~_h e messag e . l~_ cOlTpares thi:, mess a ge to 
the hash ge ne.c-a t ed by a p plylng the sender's p ubl ic key to th e 
e ::--.cry pted hash . Eve r y message uses a ne,,' key, and Clsers 
implementa t i oro o f the ?El-f s t. andard, lC;; UNIX bas e d, and runs on 
a Var iety of platforms . A PE!>j l'..brary serve s a pr.:.mary 
entry J?oint .:.nto the sys tem. management aem'..n'..stralors 
prog r ams com..T,uni c ate \.-ri th a l ocal k ey manage r coordinates 
l oca l k.ey management independent of the J?d rt.icula r applicat '..on 
reques ting i t s s ervice s . ';'he key mauager mainl a ins a l oca l 
da t abase fo r the cert if ica t. es and privat e keys, en f 8rces 
access cont r o l , and pr8vldes fo r Cryptog raphic serv'..ces 
err.p l oying pr i vate keys . 
One of t.he librari e s at '_ach e d t o TIS/PEI,j is a 
C::,;!ptologlca l library ', .. ;hi cl1 has an a l'Jorlthm indepe ndent 
i rot erface and handles key generat ion, messag e d i g es t. 
comp'J.tatlon, enCr.fp tlon and decrypti:m, a !ld Slgndture 
c ompu ta.t :i. on and ver. i f i caticn. 
'C' r S/PEH i s di stributed in sou r c e form an d is available 
t. he US alld Canada [or nOIl - coJrunerci al u se. It canno t. b e 
exported. 
2. Riordan's Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (RIPEM) 
Ri ordan's I nterne t Pr i vacy Znhanced l1a il (R :: PEM) is a 
pub l i c key enc rypt i o:l program f or use with e l ectrO:l).c mail. It 
individua l gene r ate public keys a nd 
e ncrypt /decrypt using those c::mvent i onal 
asymmetrical cryptog r aphy a nd prov i des capo<.bi ll ties 3 .1milar to 
J 2" 
agilinst the r eco!r.puted digest . I f they both m;o. t eh , chen the 
sende-::- i s verified 
RI PEn wil l nm on MS-DOS, H~cintos h, OS/2, 
and UNIX ope:cat::'-ng s ys t ems. 
SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION AND KEY MANAGEMENT ISSOES 
Both types of cryptography sys c eI!'s r e qui:ce t he u c;;e of 
proper Key :'1anageme r.t cechnl.ques. I n genera l , :<:ey generation 
shoul d noc b e user se l ected but rilther a r ando:nly gen eraced 
s e lection Private keys mus t never 1;e stored on any 
!f.edium I"hich can be copled or read and shoul d. be ste red in a n 
encryp t ed forI!' 
There a re t\<l O p r inciple methods of key distribc:c i oll The 
first i",. t he use o f Key Ciscribut i en Center s (:-<:OC). In a KOC 
all keys emanate f rom a sing le source '.'.'hich :.;.eeps trac :<: of key 
o rlginatlon and distribution. It central s 
dlstribl:. t ed to \.\,'hem a n d cen t ral 0.1 ] messages \<lith i n t h eir 
a dnun islralien . ':'he advantage of t he cen tral admin l. stration 
of key d.istr i 'cutlon is t o p r event i ssuanc e of dup l icate 
wea:<: keys. The diSc~dvantage is th a t corr uptior. o f the 
dislrl.Duc i on c~nt e r has ez tensive r epe r c ussions on l he 
Se ClJ rl ty of a ll sess ions in the system ad:rLinistered by thac 
Th e method of .-::ey distribu lion is th l: ol.:gh d i rect 
exchange kEY by corn;TlJ n :i cati.ng partners. The 
adva ntage i s th e 1 imited dis t rib ution of :<eys i n c8:1 trolling 
tr.e access to eacr. seso; i on wh i cr. protec t s o t_r.er seSS.lons 
s h o u .i d t he kevs c e cor,~roDised . 'rr_e d~,"a"aLage lies i n tr.e 
coordi :1c t i on required to establish a relic..c.~e : -.:J u a l 
au tr.e nt.lC.lty of the c:mllTlunicci ,-- ing partners. 
':'he probl em asc;oc i ated ',..lith both of these met h ods is 
:. d e n t i fi ed i n a concept called the 'Convers ation ReaJ. it y;:" 
.ln '",hieh lr.e a,e e xchanged in such a nanner to prevent 
replay or irr~ne di at_ e reuse of the same key. There 
knowL to help solve th i s prcblem . 
'T r.e f irst i s G. Cha ll eng e - Re sponse system: User- ]o. 
to eIlsure user S's mes s age i s not i:i rep l ay roe i nc ludes 
unpredi ctabl e e l e men t 0, cbl.l leng 0 i n t r.e message t8 a. 
respcn ds by US.lng some function .l L response 
cou l d no t. have been prepc.red H l advc:nc e . Af t. e r receiving o. nd 
confi,mi ng B's re~;poIlse, A i s s u r.e t:'o.t t:'e C8nvecsatlon ""it}: 
B is not a rep l ay. 
The sec8nd is a t i.mes t. aDp mechan i sm in '",hieh nessa ge 
is g ive n a t_ i.me sto.:np f or surv l val. 'rhe u ser can c heck the o.ge 
o f the message a n d decide fo r t hemself if the mes s age is t_oo 
old and possibly a rep l a'y'. 
of t :wse c a ses, enc;;:-yption o f tr.e eha l lenge -
respons e or time"t:;unp C',r.o u l d be us e d 0n s u re lr.c: t an 
cons t ruct the respen03e or modify the 
tlm,"" stamp Tr.ere f ore , thee problem 0: key managemen t is red uced 
f o r Com;:lU t er 
t o finding a key d i st ribulion pro t:JCol \"ith the t ol l ewi n g 
propert ies : " 
1. No nee6: for a Centra l Server 
2 !1utu3.l duthe>nt i c:aticn oE C01TL'l1\in~cati[lg pa rt~es 
3 A v '2r ifiable conversation by a challenge response systel! 
1. !;. minima l numbe r ot messa.qes t o exchange t he keys. 
Key exchange can e i ther ~e t hrough 3. J.irect exchange>, 
exchange vi a a third party . In each of t:"1e metho d", it i ::; 
necessary that each us er has a din"ct aut hent i cator . A J.irec:t 
authent i cator ma y i n or outs i ce of the netl>.'Ork ::::l1.l t must be 
kno\~n t o each of lhe us e rs to authenticate the session . I n a 
direct exchange, the users may be able t o aut henti ca t e each 
o t her . In a th i rd par t y the C!uL"1enti c: ator may be 
another {trusted) person \</ho a ut henlica t es each user 
individu a lly i f the t ' .. ,o lls ers cannot a uthent i ca t e each e ther 
d i r ect l y . 
In cut:"rent 3rchi tec ture, X . 5U9 p r ovides a f r.a me· ... icr·k f or 
auth e n t i ca tion ot e'<tic i es involved in a distributed direc t ory 
serv~ ce by l he ll"e a t pu~J i c ~<;ey crypto - systems. 
A cert it i cate is cen,-ri).l lo key !T8.nagement in the X. 509 
a rch i tpct:ure and PEM . The process for a u L"1entica l ing both 
parties in message t ran smi ss ion shoul d be simple. automated 
bod uni fo rm. Al though certi fica t e management syslems are 
·Ibid. pg Cj. 
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compatible with d~E fer ent. digi ta l signalure a l gori thll1S, RSA 
becoming t.he es t ab l ished cent.r.a l cJ::ypto - sys terr and has yrei;lter 
use a s t h e p r i mary diYJ. t al SJ.gnature algorit hm' 
PASSWORD/LOGIN SYSTEMS 
purpose of passv.,ro r d/log l n syst. e rns is J.de ntiflcation 
a nd aut.hent i ca t ion . An ':'nc.ividua l t e l ls t h e system 1·/ho he is 
(i d ent::'f i cat lOn:, and the syst.err. thOle t he individua l 
he (a ut. heJH. i cOlt. ion) PaSCiWJr c.s are the 
cO::1rT,on met hoC. fo:::- au thenti catio: l o f a Other 
aut h entication devi ces such o r ID 
s upplements [ 0 a convent i o nal login/passworc. sequence . 
? or every system , there is a n eed t o maintalll 
a uth e n t ication data in a stored a Lea , such as a pa sCiword t 1 l e. 
Protecticn o f this file is e xtreme l y cri[ical J..n lTIfnntalnl n J 
t C:1e Se CU r lty o f the a galnst lntrusion . MOS t compute r 
I-/i ll encrypt the ;Jass';.,rord f::'le . I f access security 
int o tne p a sswor d f l l e i s bLeached, e r.cry p t_i on stil.l r enders 
lhe fl l e-lseless unless th e de c ryp t io n key or cod e 
t he i ntruder 
syst ems per:orm a on e "lay e n crypt i on of 
th::' s rr..ea n s chat t.he paCisword is never d.ecrypt:ed. ',",'h en an 
Secu r ity 
pgs 58 56 . 
individua l logs i.n with a passwor d, it i s immediate l y 
encr-yptec. and to t he s tored encrypc ed vers i. on ot che 
".'Ord_ I f .it ma t ches, authent i.ca t.i.cn comp l eted 
In order- to detpr encrypt ed passwords f ::-cm bejng 
dec iphe.::ed , IT,any systems wil l incorporat e t he lise of a 
p a s03word f i l e \\'h ich c ontdins t he tnghest security on 
t he SY03t. e m a nd is a ccess i j le only by thp syslem a :iminis trato r . 
lmy p ass\\'o rd wr, i c h i s stored for any l e ngLh of time in an un-
encrypted form i s a s ecur-ity risk to t he whole sys t e m . 
TFoditional password rrodels use O',n iden t. i ficat icn mmilier 
am: a passw'ord ane: typica l l y f ol lol\' anyone o f t he (o l l owing 
procedures : ;, 
Compute r 
I n gerce ra l , every user c;hou ':' o rove an authentic:a:::lo:--, 
Lumbe r and PLlss'/,,'ord of h 1- >" to facilita:::e :::he 11O', e of 
rights, and for sys::em acin:ir.istrators 
monitor il legs ':' accesc; by 11si:':!9 a udi t to lden t. i:y 
violLltlon occur l'ed. un der which i dentl:::Y 
A password ap;:J::::opr i a te :lle0.sure tor 
au:::he nticatior. in many s i tuat i o:1s . but i ~. is ::air':'v v..' e ak and 
subject to attack f roIT many areOls. ' Enc :-ypted ;:Jassv..'ords may 
a:::tac>:ed :llethodica ':' l y. Host. us er s8lec t e d 
pass·,,'ords are socia ':' or peYCionallty driven and are, ::herefo::::e, 
posslJ:)lc :::0 derlve f.::-om ir.divi dual of the user and cy 
brute force lr.e:::hods (dic::ionary paSS'.-Jords 
p::::ov i cle only for si:nple authenticdLio:':! . 
r·or the purposes of :::hl S paper, LI f i revval ':' is defined a,OJ 
a gate\·;a y compu t er d e Sl g n ed :::0 2. "irr i t. access from computer 
For exam;:Jle. cO:l t rol2.ing 
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:ro:11 an o u ts i de puhlic SOULce, such ilS the Intern el , 
pr.lVaLe source , as a local ar eo. network. 
The rationale for usi ng a firewall syst. e m is a lmos t 
pr otect a p r iva te ne t .,·or).; ac:;ai:lst i nlrusion. '" In trus ion 
inclu des access to company resources hy unaulr.oriz e d user s , 
e xp o r t of proprieta ry, classitied sensitive info rma t ion , or 
t he imp o r t of a cOr:1pu ter 
I n terms of c :)Juputer n f-' t ·,,'orking , a gateway is il compu t er 
that r.eteroge neou s n e t wor k s by per : crming some 
typ e o f protocol t r ans l ation . In genera l , a fire1,-;a::'':'' 
corrposed of o n e J:"!ore o f t h e fol l ov.'ing corrponent s 
1 . A ScreeninG' Rouler \,'hich offers packe t :i': ter i ng 
and can block t raff ic between the networ k cmd a specific hos t . 
SOl'lE' " : irewa lls' used in many p riva te net" 'lOr k s ar e nothing 
more than a s creening rout er . Th j s resu l ts i n d irect 
communication be tv.,;een users on a privat.e syster:1 and a p ublic, 
wide a r ea sys tem, such as the ln t. ernet Una'..lt.ho r i z ed in t rus i on 
J..s d i f:j cu l t to d e t e ::::t if t.he n umber of high and 
tr.ere is n o fOrJ'lally a drl'.in i s t ered al..'d i t tr ai l. i f an 
e ncrypt.ed pas s word. d u then ti c: ation sysleJ:"! is u see. and the 
encrypt.i.on met h od or pass·,·mrd i s compromised. then the ent i r e 
r:rivat e syst. e :n is la i d h il ly open to a t. tack. Screen J.. n g routers 
aTe not. g enera l':y considered to be t he best securi t y solution 
Trus t ed 
I nc . 
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but are used exten s i v ely Slnce they o ffe r free 
p ubl ic ::-.e t ... ·o r k from any poi nt on the private 
ad.-niEis tra tor. as the sing l 8 c r it ~, cal stron] poi n t i n C'.ccess i ny 
che pr l vate n etlt.'orks secu r ity syslem i s ;noni toreci 
e x ::enslvely dno shcm l d und e r.go r. egul a r il.\; :l=- tS . 
a b a s t lou h o s t ,",'hich is 
:<=olaced v Dolh t h e private syslem and a Iln).;: in the p u,;:)1ic 
n e n·;o:ck I~ COIl'.!lll..!nlcates ·,.,·ith t h e publ.Lc nel ',.:or'.;. and t h e 
pr.:cvate syst en, direct tratt l c or troD1 the public 
to the pri vate sysle n is The mai n sen:ri t y risk is 
t h e gat e way .i t,::el:, sin ce lt t h e attacbn:en t po i n t 
t o t~ e public net 'work. P-. sys t em admi nistrator COl..,ld detec t and 
tra ck t he p r ogress of an i n t r.ude r. v i a a d ual h omed gat.eway. 
h a ve an advc~ nt ag e o\'er screening o f 
syst e n iIldependent so ft.wa r e maintenance a nd upg rades, a n d in 
the u til1 zaticn o f aud i t tra i ls : or security v iolat ions. 
4 . A Sc reened Hcst Gatewav is t ;-,e most comInon Cire· .... al l 
configuration and compoc;ed of the combin0.tion of a 
ro u ter. and a ba st i on scr:-eened rout er connects to t h e 
pt.:blic net'.>.'Qr.k ami "110,,,'s only "el ected services to t h e 
b as lJ.on of th e pr.ivat e m~t'.,'ork 
5 . A Screened Subne t is an isolated ne t'iJor k s i tu[~ t ed 
system anc th e ne two rk . It is 
lnsu la ted by a sc r eening r o u ter and is cu n :igu r.ed sl ~c h 
bc::h the pub ] ic p:::-ivate n e r. works h ave access to t h e 
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subnet, bu '- d i recL tedfic from the pu"::l l i c syS t c>If\ to the 
private netl"vor:..;: i s b locked Some conf~guratio:ls uti l i ze a 
bastion hest and support termina l session5 o;.ppl ~ ca tions 
l e 'lel qat Fways . 
ri . 1m .i'lPplication I.",:vel or: Proxy Gate-day are 
specif i c f orwarders which operate in a user mode above lhe 
DrotocoJ level . I t is a potential securit:y concern [or a 
firewall system it represent-s a "hole in the of the 
5yst: em for user file transfer, such " SEKDM!UL " or F'T P 
AeJpl i cation level shou l d 
ITlon i to -::ed a bastion host. 
HybTi.d Gat eways a-::e a combination of fire·,·/al l 
systems an d make use of sever-al prot.ocol5 and configurations 
to limit u nauthor i z e d access. 
1\..,'0 g e neral rule5 ir, designing and a. f ire',oJal l or 
gateway syste:n are follows : l' 
Dcn't al 1 0'.,' non-designlJ.ted users to the actuo. l 
ge.lev.:ay p rovide the services ",·hich perTut 
controlle d and e nsu r e s d ll se r vices a r e generat~ng 
login/eJaSS'f:orri./ timestamp in f oT[nation on 
trail . 
to ba se an audit 
Digit_a l 
Resourc e 
ISSUES ON AUTHENTICITY OF DATA AND USERS 
I n net ... ·iO.::k COITlrl1un icat ions , a uthsnt l cation prov id e s a way 
: 0 veri fy t he or igin o f data and identl tv of t he user. : t is 
a me a sure us ed t o ve:cify eligibi l i ty a nd 
constraints on an i n (.l.iv i dua l use r to da': a or I n: 
l e v els . .:;:t p::cot ccts against : raudu Lent us e of a sv s t em or t h e 
fraud":J l e n t lransmission of in fo:::m a t ion a nd ens u res the basic 
s c cu r lty principl e that t.he .informat ion :r:ece ived was i n 
e xa c tly the f on:, i t sen t . )! 
d .l scus spd p:::ev i ously , a re 
c'"chentication c o u ld be based upor . 3" Ot he:r: a:r: l?a s .incl ude t h e 
follo'ding : 
Pre - arrang e d inforrr.at.ion '_.'hich the use1:" poss e s ses. 
Har d\<la :r:e compo:1ent s such a physical key , magnet i c strip 
or sm3 rt ca:r:d. 
such as a finger 
Pe e r - entity a u the nt ica t ion i s uti l iz e d ',)hen t he 
authenticate t he ancl the user has n o :r: e llu ~ rene n t. to 
auth9Ltica t e t h e s ystem. 1t ge n era lly a p ass "'iOrG I:lode l 
t he u se:r: p rov i d e ," an ident i ly alld a u thpnt.icat e s 
throu=il Gl correspor. clin g p a ssI'.'o r d. A handshak~ model may a l so 
be used, which i nvo l ve s a ;Jrocedur e knewn enly to th e u s e r an::J 
the compute r syste m. \\'h <2 n t.r.e user l e g s i n. a random number 
is sent to tr.e use r viho comput-es an a n S'der based on 0 
pred etermined function c r procedure. This metr.ods al le\\'s f er 
no sec:ce L inform0t i on to be t rans fer red and does no t- r equire 
t he use o f encryption f or t he user r.esponse. Tr-:.e Ilmi tat i cn of 
lhis Syc;t e m tr. E: c c mpl e xity c f the funct j cn wr.ich the user 
must perfoJ::m to verify Limsel f . It must b e difficu lt enou gh 
not tc be easily detected b L.:. t s lmp le enough :18t to b e 
cuwberscme . 
Pee r to or :<lutua l Au t hent iedt ion is used ,·-,hen two 
t o aut h en t iC5.te e dch o t h er . Tr.e ;Jurpose .1. S 
t o pJ::'ov i de a h i gh degr.e e cf as s u:::-a nce tr.at a c onnection 
been es tabli shed I"i th t Le i :1t.en d e d pa r ty a n d !lot a ma squerade 
'C'he Handshak i ng model i s preferred f or. mu t U0 1 au t1:entication 
in f o :-rr.a t i on shared u n ti l tr. e 
a utr-:.enLic:a l i on is complet- e d.'o 
Pee r t8 Pe er a u t r.en t- ication requires tl,'O a key 
e SLabl is:'1lTlen t s t age a n d an authe nt icc.t ion stage . 'Cr.e k ey 
establi shment. uti l j zes int eracli8ns be cween 01 k coy 
d i c->cr ibut i on cen t er and t h e users to establlsh tr_E publl C cr 
keys fo r co:rununi c dtio:l. The authentica t: i cn sta g e 
{h aIldshak e ) i c ; t:r:en conducled by tLe user s an d me ssagco 
trans :::e r begin",. 
":b id, P9 83 . 
Message authenticat i on i'O o Ete n pns u .ced ~ h .cough t h~ o f 
signature";. 'The d ~gita l sig :--.ature is a s eries 0: bi ts 
ched to t he based upon the message co::'.;:.e:lt ond the 
Dig i ta l s ig:la t m:e mod e ls 
on both symmetri::; and asymmetric e:lcrypt i on slandard" 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS AND SERVICES 
tl-,is c)":,apLer ('; di:scu5si::m o f the third 
question .1S made; \'f1at aTe some of t ~e c urrent l y available 
file systems and s ervices? A short description i s 
given 0:: e (';ch sys t-ern -,'lith respect to Lle ~ollo\elir.g areas; 
sys t-em des l gn goals , a b r ie f L"leory of operation, and 
authent.icat i on, securiLY a nd file s haring and rep l i cat i on 
i ssues. T~"lis chapter concludes -",ith :". discussion of common 
charac t eristics of the ::listrlbuted fi le systems a nd 
-wi:la~_ r:hClrac ter:l stir:s a single DoD wide s yst.em s r.ould 
lncorpcrate . 
Cur.rently ,"- v a i l abl e systems under cons i de rat. i on 
The Sun Net1.·;o r k F i le Syst-em 
B . The .",ndr e '.; ?ile Sysle:n 
T;, e Coda F i le Syst-em 
D . r ile .~pollo FiJ e System 
E . AT&T Remot-e "'ile Sharing 
F' . 2?RITE Net-work File Syst-_em 
G. I Bt-l AIX DistribuLee. Services 
H. The LCCU S Cistr ibCltee. Fi le 2yst-em 
At hena and Kerberos 
F.LCUS Di stribut ed File System 
CaDman o f Rev i e\Cied Dis triJnted File 
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SUN NETWORK FILE SYSTEM (NF S) 
1. System Design Goals 
In troduce ci in 19;;5 by Sun Hicrosyst emf" tJ-:e Ne two rk 
Fi l e System (NFSi is one of tr.e most \>iide:y u c;ed f i le t::t:'an c;fe r 
sy~lem to d:oy 
Primary cons i der:o t iQns in the d ef,lgn o f NF S are In 
ar e ac-, o f porta b il ity J-:eterug e lleity i\lthougL lnitia::y 
designed [u r the UNIX J-:ave been util i z e Ci on 
pc - n os machine s . This t ype of portabillty possi b le tecause, 
d u r i ng t h e d esign of KF S . Sun Microsysterr,s k.ep t the NF S 
protoco: an d t r.e irop l eI'lentat i on scr.ernes separat.e. The protoco l 
de :iC"l es t h e int erface allCl'is ch e serv er to loca l 
f ll es but no t d ic ta t. e hm·, th e se r ver should i mplement the 
i C"lte r f~ce or:- its use by t r.e c:.i. ec,t 
The i mr .l eI'lent3 t.i o n of KF' S defiC"les t ~.e ext e n t: of t r.e 
E.i. l e cac r. i ng, rep l ica tloC"l na.:r,i ng and cunsi st.eC"lcy Tr. e 
in terface ~rotocol to be "stateless ' \-lhere t r.e 
requ est. uf t: he serv er' by t h e cl i ent cOC"lta i ns a: l t.Le 
necef,s a ry .l.nf oLrnatio;"l ·",hic r. t he seLover r e qulres abou t tJ-:e 
c lieC"lt Th is lnfonr,at i on , therefo re , Goes nol n eed to be 
Ta i Tlt2.L!1ec.. by the server . 
NFS o n Stero .ds " Lt.l.N '::"ecr.nolOQ"""Y, Marcr. 
19 93 . 
2. Theo ry o f Oper ation 
Initia lly , treated all workstaticns peer'S ""here 
the roles of. c l ient and server co u ld ~e per:ormec oy any 
machi n e . Despite r.his cesign it i s more COIfL"11C n for sysl:e:n 
administrators to ccn f igure loca l instal l ations v!i t.r. a li:ni'..ed 
nurru:::er of v.'Orks t a t ions decica~.ed solely as servers and the 
remaining workstaticns as clien~.s. 
:::ach f ile name vlith Nf'S has c. "priva t e r eot " which 
ac~. s ~. o bounc t he fi l e to n odes wi t hin an aQ'll i nist ra tive (ile 
sysc.em. Each \\'o rkstation, in manipUlat ing the file, confl.gures 
its ewn n a rrcec;pace on the f:'..le in conjunct ion ""ith its p ri\'ate 
root . 
"n NPS clien '_ wil l cache remote f i2.es, ciirectories, 
and ;:la t h - name translations inte main memory and r,ot onto a 
loca l disk. Al o n \,) v.ith t he cach e of the f i l e. a t.irres t amp is 
also cached indicates v,'hen th e> fi le laCit. modified on 
the server. Th i s t i mestamp i s used fe r a " latesc 
va lidation compari nq the cached cimestamp I'lith the fi )e 
t~mestamp. :-::f the cached t i mestamp is !l1()re recen t , t h e f i l e 
timesta!'lp is considered inva l id a nd the client '.'.'il l re - cache 
t.ne curre nt fil e from the Th is Vi'llldi'l':.ion check is 
done at e ach f ile opening. Oi -:;-ector i e s ar~ cached in a manner 
similar to files \"ith the e xcep t ion t hat any ;;lodif i ca~ion i s 
performed di I:ectly 
Data trdnsfers fo::: NFS o.re normally donf' i n b l ock 
sizes of eight ki l cbytes. F i l es dre f etched in ent i r ety i f 
4 0 
sarvar-~~rvar 
also holds Iirstto 
~ resild 
1 )Cliellt B requests file from server. The request contaillS required info; node, orig namespacc. 
alld timBstamp 
2)Flle is cached into clienl's memory along with servel's timestamp of the lasl me modification 
3)for reco.~cilliation the cl ient compares its cached copy timestamp with the serve~s version 
I: the Servers is more recent. it re-caches the servel's copy of the file 
4)Modifications of files between servers are replicated manually by the user 
5)For read-only replication. no manual update botwoon servers is required 
Figure 2 _ SUN Net. ·, o r k Fi le Sys t.em 
they ar e s mal l e L- ~.hi s thr es r.o ~ d . 
Cu rre:: :: vp rsioIlo; o f NFS o; upr;o r t. rcp l.icat.lon 
mechani s m '"herp ret'lot c P0 1Il t c; t or t i l e 
ac:cp ssibi l ity a r e s~;o>c] f i ed usi n g a se t o[ 
client lsc;ues a r eqqest t o r a fi le , th~ f icst to 
respon d is c~ospn tr-le remotp automounter pOl ilL . 
add' - i ona l requ e s t.s th is poin t ci i re cLed 
rppl i cal iO:l mec~aniSr:l 
ta l:" read-on l y Vl c e Because :;~ l hi ~ :::ea d-
only ), al l D~ccoc,a U.c"o o [ fil e modifica t ions of file T.epl i c3.s 
he l d by b e pcr f onFed on those 
se:evers by Lhe 
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3. Authentication, Security and File Sh arin g Issues· ' 
uses under l ying UNIX :nechttnisms for fil e 
prote::tion a nd system acce;;;s. I t can a l so be ::cnf i g u red to 
fo r a fl.igJ"l l e vel cf seC1.Ti~_y based on th e 
en c rypt ~on algo r i t hm f or a uthenti ca t i.on and c lie nt / serv e r 
validal i cn at each reques t . Pub l i c/pr i va te key e:lc rypt i on 
techniques a re als c support ee. to provide for mutual 
autbe:lticat i on of t h e DES k ey. 
One comp l L::ation of L1.e state l ess KFS p ro tocol 
reduced fun::t i o na l 1 t y with respect to f i l e loc k ing c; uring 
muH_i p le o n a d i str i buted sys t em ",.'ithin the lIEIX 
::::Iomain . F.LI e l ocking al low s fo r only one user :ncdification on 
the f i l e a t a t ime, where t he f ile ' locked out " from others 
'.dlO ' ... ' i sh t o m8dify the f i l e 2.t [ he o-,ame moment. l\ l oc;';' on a 
fil e c ons ti tutes s t at e information on t ~ le server (The se r v er 
has to bIo:: k t o t h e fi le ). 1:1 a UNIX sys t em t his i s 
acccunted f or by t he Sun operatJ.ng which provides f or 
a separc~te "lock s erv e r" :;;J e r:o rm t his ope.::-ation. 
.lmot h er issue conce r ning f i le rep l ication and locatio:l 
t ranspare ncy i nvo l 'Jes workslatio:l ide w:: if i ers. 
each 'vwrkstation is free t 8 con f i gl.lre i ts own namespace , there 
i s n o gu a r anl e e that eac h '-,'o r kstat i on will u ti l iz e a 
view of 0. shared f i 1 e or thCl t nar.li;lg cenf.1 ict s won'~_ 
.1S gene r a l l y overc ome by sys tem 
-,·, 1:0 co l .: a bo r ate o t her s J.. mi l ar gro-Jps to conf~g~l re t heir 
wc r k s t a tion ' s n a rr espa c e J.. n a s i mila r maIlner . As a result , 
l 02 c:~i on tra!lSparen c y i s e nfor c e r:: by personn e l c onven t :'- o!l 
?emot e fi l e access a nd .rep l ica ti o n i s s up ported 
t ypes of 
prev ious ly 
s e c o nd i s 
TLe first an c..Dt omo unt. e .::- ias 
f or repli c a t i o n o f read - on ly f iles . Tr.e 
t ~"1e L;.se o f "YellO'tJ Paqes ' 'ill1icl: prov.1 d e ·3 f or 
a li s tlnq of s peci f ic app l i c at ior,s , ~lser-nc..me 5 , and 
l: o st. namPS a nc. r,e twork. address e s, a n d ne t -dork 
I nt e r n e t por t lLun'bers The '{ella,,; Pages prov i de r ead - o n l y 
r ep l i ca t ion u t i li z ing ma"t e r f ~ le a n d s evera l 
f i l es . (r e a d on l yl b e p er f orme i e ny rep l.i c a t ed 
sleve ~u t mo c ~ : ~ ca l J.. o ns c an c n ly be perfo r med on t."1e me s te r 
f ll e _ Any mO l:' ~ f ica tion t o ::r.e mast e r :i l e be man ual ~y 
p ropaga :.ed t o t ~~.e s lave fi l e s. 
THE ANDRE"'" FILE SYS TEM ( AFS) 
1. Syste m Design Goals 
Tl: e Fi l e Sy s tem ',,'as deve l cped by TI'dn Sa CC 
Corpo r: ,: i on o f Pa . I t i s a Cl i e n t - Serv er c ompu :. e r 
which prov~de s fo :::- ~:.:.thent ica t ~, o " 
by c ;)lnb i ni ng t h e func r. icnal:'- ty c f t_]-:.c 1<' .1. til 
~ Kerbe r os sty Ie ti cket. auc.hentication sc h e me wh i ch has b een 
ot"..::gme nt. ed wi t. h access cont ro l li::;t s 
JI,F S 1 S a n atte:np t. t o comb ine 3- u ser in t er f~cE' of 
persUlli)l COJTLpu t ing vii th t he dat a sharing c apa b i l i t les ::> t ti:ne 
sha ring s yst e ms. 
2. Theory of Operation 
The AFS cons ist.s o f a di s tribute d collec t i::>n of 
s e r ve r s known collect ively as These 
1 5.1:"g<3 n umber of l>!Orksta t lons 'dhich run a co l l e c tion of 
soft\,'a ~e knc,.m, as "Vlrtu e " , A.l l fl l es ar E- s torec:. p E-rm3-n e n tly 
F i l es a re ma J.nta inec:. ternporar ily In t~'1e 
virt u e c lien t s by caching . \vor k s ta "t i::m 
inst a l lat i on \~ i l l US E- a <; l oba l name for its USETS i den tif iErs. 
erV~ ' ~ ~A s..-e u:=-n: 2 I ~~ I 
4 1 1)RolQOJGS1 mlldoto Server A- S9rv&raithQ, holds~IaOl maps to 
/ whglllthafoleis~tlid(sarv&rB) 
~r/ 
:, or";~\ ) 2)tf file i~.1oce!ed in Server B, B sands fit" Ie A for trall,l", to 
~ rBquoolongcli"ntvlIltheroechemal1l!g8,[Veou') 
, CachO Mgr 3)AH...a:lIwrttB performed 0<1 <:!Iched tXlpy. If fila is modiflGd 
it is copied bacl< to the custodiBI SOfVor fer stomga 
4)Clllt-M~k system whe,e ""Mlr informs cfiGnt if II fila is boling 
Note: Systemlliso klantifOlis which foles 1If&0ft9n rood but 'Bm:y 
modiflOdandlabooladwi\hll' ,..oo-<>nly"mllrker 
Figure 3. Andrew Fi le Syst.em (APS ; 
SeCtl r l tv ' ./0.. Pract ~ ca l Tutorial ' . 
191. ~ 
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ScaJc.b~lity is t h e dominan t des ign c:mside ratlon in 
.~FS. I t has an ti c ... pated f i n al Sl z e of 00 0 
nodes File partit~oned into a 10Cid 
n",mespace i" l o c dtion transparent t o Ul e useI' ~C-, ide ntical 
on al l The wo::-kstation con c a ins only temp orary 
chose specif~c fil e·,s (or workst_il t~o n 
in~tiali zae ion. Va t a ~magH!g fo r the us e rs is 
e a ell ',-.;orx stacion thell' f i les uti l ize a shared namespacp 
Thp namespaces themse lves are str:-uctured in a 
"er archica::' order . They &re p a rlitioned EltO s ubtrees ,·,-hicb 
single servpr :::"'- lled '" sub t ree custodian. 
Each server also a copy o f a fu l ly replicated 
loca t ioll database cU3tod i ans . 
'Tbis data:Jase mai.ntains Slze mallagea:::ility s ~nc e the 
cus to d i anship mainly to the su":Jtrees individ ual 
f~les . 
F l. le:o ~ n a s!'.ared name space a ::-e cached on local disks 
of the wcrks t ation ,,,,r.lC!'. dre :::[)ntrollej a cacr.e manage::-
ca il ed Ven<J.s. ,'/n en a user opens a f~le , Venus Vc'l l l firs t check 
wo r kstat i ons cache 
ellere, t r.e 
th [C pT e senCE of a va lid c opy . I f 
is treated a open f~l [C . If i t is 
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Ca ll1eCj"l [C Ee llon 
no l , ",-,i ll fetch a copy f rom the oust odian o f the file. 
Al l r-ead and ",-' r ite opera tions a re perfo rmed only on t h e 
copy. I f the cached copy is mcc.i fi ed, it 
is l[l.e:! e opiec. back Lo t he custocian of that f i le when the 
,,"o r ks tat.ion fl l e is closed . 
Ca:::he consistency be t ·",een users i Oi ma i nta i ned via a 
:::al l back syste m ',,,he re the server lnfonns t he c l ient if Lhe 
f.de is bei ::lg mod i fi e c by anothe::: pc.r t y. Fil e a vailabili t y i s 
i n c r eased by l de::1t i f yin g "" h i oh f iles are most of t e:! read but 
r a re ly mod ifi ec i;iS labeled "''' i th a " read - onl y rep l ication " 
Concu:::re:1CY control o f a f :1.1 e is t h e ab ili t y to 
cont r ol ope :::atic::lOi on thOl t. fi le by mo re thom on e workstatie:! 
s i mll l t aneously. I t is provi ded for wi th t imi:lg loc k and un l o ck 
operaticns by the system acirr,inis t r aLor or file c 'J stod ) a ::1. If 
a leek o n a gi ven file is no t r e l eased by Ll"',e client ,,·ithin a 
spec ified time (for exa mpl e , 30 mi::lutes) then it time d ouL 
by t h e server and beco:nes unlocked for e ther c l i ents. 
3. Authentication, Security and File Sharing Issues 
U:l l ike Kerbercs, t he AFS pe r tor ms 'Tlutual 
authe::1t i cat ) o ::1 be tween th e 'dorkOitation a"d the Vic e servers at 
t h e b e ginn i. ng of the COIl'Il'unicat i o n ~ roc e s.';3. After t h e firs t 
c.ia l ogu e , subsequen t communications can b e e ::1crypt ed OJ:: merely 
beLl-/ee::1 
',.ro rk s ite s does not cccu r s ince l ocal copies of t he f ile s are 
::ached on l y . On ly I"ocks'::ations which are conne cted via t r .e AFS 
i nsta l l at ior. caYl sr.are f ileS or sites ot.:t s i de tr.e 
sys t eT:'. ::annot sr.a c e servpr f~l e s .... ~ 
Syst e m ;is pce dica'::ed on the" lnt e g:city of the 
\ept p'l:/ sir:il lly seC'.lre ane. only 
accessible by trusted sys ,::pm 
and the net·,lOr \.:; l ,:: s e l : a re a SS'.l!l'.ed. by '::he 
~ Lere fore , all s ec ur e Lra elsmisSlons rely sol e l y o n e::,.d to end 
e ncryptl o n. 
AFS us e s c. r::: es s l ist me::ha nis ms f or 
All system p rivi l egpO', upo:; t he 
spec ifi ed e ither direct ly to :him or tl;e g roupO', '::0 ".'h i ch he 
belong s . AF2 a l so allm,'s for "n ega'::ive rights " 
ind i :: il~.es a de:-:ia l of selec te d services t h e 
.;:"FS a u lhenticatlon rFechanisms a.::e com;0iltible I>.' it h a n d c a n 
b e supp l emented by Kerbe r o s autheYlti::a t lor. n e c hani sms of 
Proj ect ll.t h ena, dev el :Jped a t the 110.ssachuse'::t s In5t itll te of 
'l'echno l o9}-' . They r esemb l e ea::h other te r ms o t arch i tec~.\.!c re 
and. b oth USE s i milar. autl1 en t i c a~ion sch~r:L~s. ,-
The data structure us e d by AFS is buill around a 
collec t ion o f f iles and director i es i n the namespace of 
a s~rr. i~ar custod i an cal l ed cl ' volume " ':'here i s usua11y one 
vo l ulr.e pe r user and volume sma ~ l enough to 
severa l partit i oned vo l umes GIl each sen/GJ::. The volume s 
a l s o : onr the basis for t. l:e backup and res t o ra ti on processes. 
Bdckups are create d by cloni ng the fi l es and then sending tl:e 
clonec, to a s t. aging macr. i ne f or transfer onto a storage medi a 
Authentica t ion and tran s l al i on of llsers f ro:l'. d i ft e rent 
adffiin i st r atrve doma i ns a r e coordinated by the u se 0: cells. 
Cooperil t:'- ng cel ls il dh ere tc a c;t anda :cd set of ;Jrotocols a r:d 
nami ng conventionc; ·which provide the user \·,'i t ]-: the image of a 
singl e fil e namespace. 
C. THE CODA FILE SYSTEM 
1. System Des ign Goals 
Tice Coda Fi l e Sy stem "'ias design e d for a 
'workstation based on iO. l arge scale d~st:rib'l t ed compu t i ng 
envi ronme r:t . It provides fo r se r ver rep i ication by storing 
f j l e copies o n mUl tiple s e rvers, and d i scon:lee t ec o p erat i on 
whier. is an exeeuticn rr.ode where t r.e cachi:lg sit '" terr.porar.l. l y 
tr_ e t""o l e of a r ep l .l. catioIl s ite. Discon:lect ed oper-a ticn 
I"a s de signe d to enhance t:.Le use of portabl e 'dorksta t iuns .l. n a 
d is t r~ lJu t ed p rocessing environment _ '" 
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Other design goals '--:1eluded 
r:: er f ormanee, anc main t a '-- n ing a degree of 
con s'. s t e:1ey wit l :"n t he file rep l icc,t'--on s ~ r ucture The ~ ';y s tE'm 
lS loca L i on transparent ",no is b a sed on t h e U:-U X file sy~;tern 
Coda is an eXL e n SlOn of the capa b i l ::.tie s of the ?:-'.dre" 
Fil e Sys t em (l,FS ) and :" :0, an attempL to mainta:"n the 
fun ct i cna :C it y , performance , and admin ::'s :-_nlti ve edse o f Ar S , 
but at temp ts t o L.mit lts me chanica l 'Ifu lnerabil i t ie s to s erver 
ne t h'o r k compon e nt f ",i l ures in a l a r ge area f ::' l e s har ing 
e nvironme n t. 
1'he d es i gn g oal o f Coda is data 
a vc ilabil:"ty whic h a llO\'ls data 
e xt:::'a n eous f a'-- l u res e l s e',\,here th e 
goa l is t c a l l o',,"' for t he i n tegr a t ion of on port a ble 
comp ut e r s , The ces igned to emula t e Ul\IX f ile 
hi.gh l y scal a b l e ,-,'hi 1 e au t_oma t ical l y 
a ccommodati n g data d8sp :" te a r a n g e o f s yo-,t em 
fai lur es. 
2 . Theory of Operation 
ret a ins mc[",y Ot the same fea t ure s as Ar S: a model 
compos ed of a f 0'''' trus t ed pro r;ec t ed SErve r s wi t h severa l 
rll e 
unt rusted clie"t.s . It i s also simil ar Lo AFS in Lerms of 
clie:lt cachi:19 of entire fi l es O:lto l oca l workstation storag e 
and the use of coordinated syste:T' 
ad..Ti nis tra t i v ely ma in ':: din cached file cohe .ceoce. 
For replication operates dl f fe rent l y . I t t. he 
server [or r e plication v..'here f i l e::; aTe copied a o d stor e d 0::1 
fF.ul tipl e ,; erve r s. This al l m .. ·s for" a hi ';,her file avai l abili t y 
r a te t han AFS pTovices . The client r e lJ.e s on t he serve r for 
replica tion as l ong as the cl i ent cl'ai::1tains contact '.'J.th at 
least one server. I f contac t ed. then :;. 
' di"ccmnected " operat i on occurs where the client relies solely 
iLs cached ve-:-sio::1 of t.he fi le. achieves h.i.gher 
ava ilab ility t han .J\FS by the :::-eplic:atio::1 of Liles ac ross 
s evera l servers [vice a sing l e custm:l:'-a n fo r .,t,.FS), and by 
a llo"ing fo r c lien t" to operat e e n tirely ou l of the i r ca c h e if 
a server is no t connected . 
The unit of :::-eplicatiun i n Coda i s a vol1.1me: a se t: of 
f .i.le s and d i rectories loca ted 0:1 one serve r anc'. f or:'1ing a 
part i al su b Lree o[ a shared namespace. Each :i le and direc Lory 
has a 1 0',\' level fi l e " iden t i f ier" v..'hicI1 i dentifies i t self to 
a pa::::enl volume. ,"'.11 rep l i ca s of a fi le contain the f ile 
i c.e:--,li f.ier . 
'rh e of se rvers '",i th replicas o[ a vo lu:'1e 
constit'1.t_ e a Vo l ume St.or c~ ge Group iVSG ) . 11 vo l ;..:rrLe repl i ca ti o~' 
databas e is also present in every server and adrriIlJ.stra Li ve ly 
rna i ntail1s the a"LOc.nt of vo l wne repli:::a t i8:1 a:cd .its as scciat 02c 
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Volume StoraGe Group (VSG) Y 
1 }Server replicates files/volumes to other servers providing for file OOrlsisteocy aOO a databasa 
01 storage sites 
2}Cliants raqUDst file for eithor connected or discomected operations 
3)Cact1ed vlllsiOll of file geas to al l rllq l.l6sMg clients. Sllrvers insurlllhll repijcatiOrJ 01 thll 
modifred files occurs 8-cross other servers 
Figure 4. Overal l View of Coda 
storage s il eo A c l i en t manager (cal e d Ve n us in I.ceeps a 
_ i c: t o f the volu[;18 s to r e- s e g ro ups f or every vo l ume f rom '",hie n 
it ha~ c3.c nprl data. Th rs list is ca:":" ec. eC I Volume 
St orage Group (AVSG) ane. each c :" i en t mai n t ai ns (} copy of t h is 
sep,-: r atc grO\lp 1 s t J.ng. 
The rep l:'.. cati u n stra t egy uses a read - one, 'I.'r i t e -a l l 
approach . a requ es t 2-:3 made fr om a c l:'.. en L to a 
the cli ent h' iJ J also co n l a ct ot her c o e nsure c r.e copy 
being ceceive e. i s tl1e late st version u tiliLing a tJ. lces tamp on 
t_ h e Z: ile. If not , (} l::.sted ll\eI'\b(~ r u f the c l i ent ' s ;,;:'..t h 
t_ he :"at esL copy (a rr,ore rec e nt t u ne stc:ll'_p ) at the f :'..l e 
the retrieva l sit e 'where t h e f i :" e J.S t hen 
r e tran smJ.t t ed 
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' JRequBsl forfile !<mllstampcruackcd If 
ooes to that srte for file 
:J ::r':::=~ "'~:;: 
~:: 2)Latest fi l6 transmitted toc ll.mt 1 2 1 3 ., 3)Upon closong of file mods are propogatodby clentto llll AVSG /-~ members ~oId ng that r,le 




No VSG ac:oass lor latest varsion 
of file. Usas cached fila until 
oonnoction is rlIstored. Oporation is 
transparenttolheusel 
Figure 5. Ce di) in Connected an d Di sconnect ed l.Jc6es 
After t he file h as been modifi e d , it .1 0.; closed ana 
transf e rre d to a l l AVSG membe rs . v.'it b t his method o f f i l e 
propaga t ~on, t h e b urde n is on the c lient ' s processor rather 
than the server. This r e duc e s the prcce:;:s ing burden of the 
se r·l er and, consequenl:: l y, el imin0t es a cy pi c al Dottlene::: k of 
illany other types o f distributed file systems . " 
Dlscon nected ope:::-a tion is i nic 1. a ted ny c h e clienl '",hen 
no rr,enilier 0: a Vo l urnp Serv er Gr oup i s a va i lable 
tra nsparent c o the use r u nles c> a n e r r.or j n cache o ccu r s, 
in \",'hi c h un able to cont inue unt~l n O!:'rr,al 
operat-lon Un l e " ,;: a confl ict detect-ed, 
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t hen r: he a ".)tcmG!tic reL J rn to !lormal opera t ion is 
tra n sparen t . t.ll e d .L sconnecLed o;J e ration ends , th e c :" ien t 
p',.:m aqer r e in t eqra tec; the cl ient f ~ 10 by 
seq u ence of u pdate ope~'a tH)n", tc make r el--'licas 
icie:1t ical to the c0;JY . Con f l ict 
r e selut i on I f Ccda 
a ut oma tically an update confl i ct lJet",'een replicas, a 
c; yo: t elf. ad.."11in istrator m":.lst manual l y ':.h e d iscrepan cy 
Authenticati o n, security and F i le Sharing I ssues 
:s an a tt elT'pt to ~ncorporate the v~rt ues o f J..FS 
in a l crge sca:"'e f::_ e d i strib'J t i on <l i t h hlgher 
aVCli l ab:Llity . Coda io; a i s c-; sill",i l ar to t he LOCUS Di stribu ted 
Opera t i ng Systerr in t hat bo th UNIX d i r e ctory semant_cs to 
conf:"'ict re O'ol-cit i on between r ep l l cas. HO'd€,l}er, unl ~ke 
LOCUS, fi le secc.rity a L:,ndamenta :'" "JOa l de5: qned i n te 
Coda, it sc.ppor ts a token-based a"J ,::hent~ C iltion 
to-end dOi t a encrypt ~on met hods . ,-, 
and e nd 
Coda based c l i ent/server mo de l ane. 
incorporates t he of por table 
dic;c oIllle c:ted opera t i on and ',,'hole fi l e cacLing 
t hrough 
rep _lo cation 
Clien ts must updat e a l l server r ep l i:;a s and users CO"·c"",,"oce 
to t hrc :] h an approxima t i on of UNI X seIT,antlCS . 
~;pecii .l ca ~~y des lljn e d for a ' ... 'orkstation 
to r e duc e ne tVio rk and s"" rver 
' i bid . 
load, s,,-,pports use:r: m8bi l i ty and s yst_ em sca lab i l i ty . 
Re p l icat i on is u !3 e d on l y serve rs . Cl :len t s keep l rack 
only o [ t h e s e rve rs ano no t of o the r client s . l>\odi f ico.t i ons t o 
the server replicas are :r;erformed hy the clienls vlhich 
s erver wo rkload. 
APOL LO DOMAI N F I LE SYSTEM 
1 . Sys tem D e s i gn Goals 
The Apol l o Doma in Fi le Syst em :i\OFS) built by 
p.p o llo Compu t ers Inc. in 198 0 for a distributed vlOrk sta tlon 
e nVJronment . The p urpo:o;e o f the sy:o;tem p rovide on 
ef f icient comput ing b a s e for a mode r a t el y sized gr8up of 
co l laborat i ng indiv i d u a ls . U!11ike 1.r S , sCc"- le not the 
dominate design considera t ion. The underly i ng net'l>'OTk 
techno l o9'l" i s a p r opri etary token ring \",ilere s ome n8des 
anc the r e st clients . This meth o doL 8gy is o n l y for 
u se r convent i or. a s I,OFS t rea t s nodes peers. 
The goa l s of the syst e m are l ccc.tion 
da ta cons istency, a sys t em enforced uni f orm namillg s oheme , and 
a -.1nl: ormed method o f a ccess contr8 1 . Ot he r c.dmin is t rative 
;,oo.ls of t h e s ystem are f u ll [ u r. :: tiolwlity, good performanc e 
and ad __ ni n ist rative ease . ;' 
Systems " for 
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Su r vey o[ 
SC lence, 
File 
Theory o f Operation 
ADFS ulili7 e s an ObJ ect Storage System 
the distribll ti cm of f i l es _ On top u[ the 
S i ngle Level Store p rovides [ er i'l may~A" d vi rtUi."" 
memory in t er f ace fo r t:, e ob j ec ts. 
Each obJ e ct withl.n the system is named by a User 
I d entification (U ID I mark e r. lI: :>'s "H-e 0 64 strln q 
composed o f a unique creat i ng 'dork statlon and a 
Every object j-_c~ s a home node t he 
th rough a "Hint" A " l\'aning " s""rver maps strin~y 
to U: D 's and p rovije ~3 a hie rarch i c a l, UN:X - l ocat i on 
t ransparent name s pace for all fil es a n d d i -::ectorics i'.' i t hin th e 
system. Direc tor ies ',>"ithln A~FS a r"" objects 'dh~ch map name 
comp;:menl s to urn 's . A ne t'do r k \"¥'ide r oot direc t ory of the f i le 
nameSDace ~s im;:Jleme n r.ed a r e pl i cat e d d istributed d &t_abase 
",vit I, t j,e server l oca t. e d as t ::e siLe of e ac l:. repl~ca . 
• r,. ti:nesta:np indicatin g the las t modi :icat i on 
as soc~a t ed ' '''lt h each obj e c t every Ci'lc h ed contcH ns 
th e t_::':":"est amp . cons i st ency i s main[ain ed by compa r in9 
ob j ect tU 2stam;:Js the o :cig i nal object t i me s tamp i n 
l, ome node. Any ob j e c:t tound i nv al i d is 0utomat ica l ~y 
d i scaLied 
Objec l conc u r r e ncy ::ontro l :"s i ntegrat ed '/"Ji U--'. 
mana g emen t v~a a n ode d r iven manager "' ·,,'h :"c h syn :::h!:'oniz es 
LO any ob ject t he r_ome n ode's domai n. Tr.e ~oc k 
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~ l)::~:n~~::;i:;~:r~ated 
I~ia its networkwida root directory 
, 
c!z, _ "_;c_, - - 2)RleWi~tim9sta~istransmittedfor 
I SLS (map) I companson with client's cached fi le with 
/ 
ass timestamp. Ctient will discard caclled 
2 1 4 .. 
- - 3- - " copy Iftransmlttad IIIe more recent 




3)Sarver (home node of file) witl lock fila 
fOfaspecifladtima 
4)11 another client requests some lila; 2 
operalion!lll.llowed:(a)Multiple read and 
single write or (b) Multiple read/wr~e 
Iromasingle node 
Figure 6. Apol l o Do:ctC1in F i le Syste r:l 
:nilr:age:- a ]lO\·/s fo r two lype 0: opera t ions: ml;ltiple 
distribl.ted readers and a si n'J"le vl:::ile to an obj e::: t. or 
for- mu l tiple a nd v; r ite ::- s lor:: :ot ed dt a single 
no de . 
3. Authentication, Security and File Sharing Issues 
AVE'S does not s -.lppo:::l ::::ead - only 0:::: ::::ead-lorrit e data 
:::epli cation. Th e::::e can be only one home node fcr a:1y obj er:: t at 
Secu :::-ity of ADF S relies on t h e p hys i ca l s e c ur i ty of 
the works ta t~on s and t h e securi ty of tLe operating system 
ke rnels. 'di tn in Lhem . Since Lha ne Lwork is assLCmed to be 
date t.rans:niss i ons Lodes nct encoded. 
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the kernel are l'\an e to r:reve~_ t use r 
tru ;:;ted 
ADFS s -"~ports encrypted 
ldat i on of the user Lo the 
daLa:Case 
o n ly sltes for avai labi L _ty. 
log i n method s fo r 
'Jse r regls tLles are 
and :n u lt iple 
A:C?S supports a d ecentralized odnnn i str-a tion reglme 
"ihere di ff erent group s a sinql e f o r system 
nanageTent Th i s al lO'-.'ls eac h gro up t o engage its sys t en 
admin::.st r ator has f:l1:- rnanipula t.ion of any 
to t,hot g r-oup _" 
1 . System Design Goals 
~cmote pi 1 e Sha r- l ng i s a d:lstributed fi le system 
developed by AT&T fo r its v version of CNIX ond uses a 
p reci se emu l ation of local UNI X semdIlti c s o t local Any 
operat lon 0 remote fi le ide nLi cal to any operation 
on a locc~ l fil e. 'This design p hi l osophy ex t ends to other 
mechan i sms 
design goals include 
conC l]. rr- ency cont :::-ol, ' . ..,r i te sharing 
contro l of remote c.ev ices. Other 
po_!::"tabillty ond accuracy 
2 _ Theory of Operation 
RFS is ba "ed on c lien t server rela t i o r:shi p s 
Sys tem V mechanisms f or po, tabi l ity 
tra r. sp o r t p r oto:::ols 'The server whic h f il es o r 
subt.r e e" it. wishe s t o export wit'fl =. net.\.,;o r k wide symbo l ic 
n ame. The c l ie:lt import s th e s y :nbo ll c na:r.e and us(>s " 
tra nsla t e the s y mbo l ic name to a ser'/ er a d d , e ss 
t he f~le , 
1 )Server "advertises' its exportable liles 
2)Client requests file via a symbolic name. 
Naming server trartslates the location 
address Of that file 
3}For remote operations a klcal client wi ll 
forward the file list from the sarver 
4)The local client intercepts the 
request from the remote site and forwards 
it to the server, maintaining the link tor Itle duration of the call 
Figure 7, il.'T'&T Remote F~l e Sha r i r:g 
ny \J.s~ng t he serve , f o r a ll 
r e lTlot.e t il e syst em ca l l s . ."- c l i ent \.,;i l l inte r cep t d ca l l, 
f o r wa r d ~ t t o the " erver a n d t h en r e cre ,~t e t h e r e quest t. h e 
s e .::"v er t o r :.h e duration o f t h e c(;). l l 
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I r. f ormation cacl1 i nq i s m3.in t ained ir. the cl ients :na in 
f:'Iernc r y al'.d is used only read - or.ly of simp l e : 1. 1es and n o t 
direc t: or l €S or of t he fi l e 1. S cr,€c \.ed 
when it is opened. t h e si tuat i. on i::; a sing l e '.: -::::c_ -.",r 
rr.ul t i p l e r ""aders, theE c 2 chi.ng is d isabl.,.d unti l t h e 
\·.'1:it er close s lhe :1. 1e. :f t he re are m.ll t iple theE 
-"'l. ll ca c hing in t h e system is disab l e d. 
3. Authentication, security and File Sharing Issues 
Pro tecti on of :=l.I"S : 1. 1es aEG di rectories are 
exactly a" in UNIX, e l i eE t imp l icitly l r ust each 
o t h e r . :=l.FS also provides [or mechan i sms L a map user a n d 
i d [." ::-,.- fc r sha r ed across adIniJ:is tra tive 
al l owances re,t r ,etwn p,-ivil e g e s o f remo t .,. 
local 
RFS simi l a r t o NI"S wi th th.,. ma j or di fferenc e b e ing 
that t ranspo rt. y r otoc01 is slat.,.les::;. mainla1.ns a 
f or file oyer ations . :=l.FS not read i l y sU9pD rr. 
f i 1 c r ep l icat ion Dr protoco l ." for e s t abl i sh ing a r e p l :i c at ing . 
s harin g r e l a t i onship. <;, 
i bi d , yg3 90 91. 
"Tn lff les 
110 
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F. SPRITE NETWORK FILE SYSTEM 
1. System Design Goals 
The Sprit e Ne t \vor k Cper at :'- ng Sy s t em ( SNC S ) \>Ias 
d e v e l oped t or \>iork s tat i on opera tions by t h e Un i v e rsity 
Cal ifornia a t Eerke l ey. Ther e ''''e re major d e sign goals o f 
SNCS, e f f icie:1t.Ly use '.-JCl)::k o-,t a t iun :na i n rne ffi8 ry 
suppor t rrul tiprocessor 'dQ,ck e'cat.i oc,e, e n s ure e ffic ien t n e t\vo r k 
communica Lions, p r8v i d e =0 1' ci skl es s operations , emul3.te T)NIX 
f ile system s eman t i cs, and provides f or dis t r i b ut e d f i Le 
sys t em Eacil i ties s uch as p r oc e :o s 
2 _ Theory o f Operation 
SNOS was d esigned t c b e a disk l ess wit h no re01 
dis tinction betv..'een a n d clien t ; Iwweve r . t h e 
impl errent ati8n o[ SNCS incor'pora ted a [e'.'! jedi cated servers 
"li th di sk st orage Th e j nterEa c e sys t em EroTT1 t h e 
a l o catio: l trans p a r e n t ')NIX f i l e mechan i sm t o t he 
clients. 
Serv ers respond t.O c lient file requ e s t s b y 
"r e rro t e l i nks " or point ers which a r e crnbedded i n the fi l e 
:o;yst e m a t each :o; e rve r. Cl ien t s main t ain fl l ocal pre fi x tab l e 
map s p a thname pre fixes t o t.he :o e rve:::s. 
The s e r ver i s no tified whenever a c l ient ope ns or 
closes a read-on l y f i l e 
f or 
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i n itiates a rea d - 'vlr i t e fi l. e 
Survey 0= 
Sci ence " 
F:!.l e 
pgs 91 -
opera':ion. Th e c l l ent t h~ file valida t e i t 
!::he va l id i t y o f the =:: 'es ar:6 in t ernal ccn:sis t e ncy of 
1 )Client A opens file for read only or raad/writa operations 
2)Pointers in lile system structure locata the file 
3)File is cached in client, validated by comparing timastamps 
4)11 multipla read/wri ta operations occur, caching 0: the fila is discontinued unti l all cl ients 
closatheir/ilas 
Figure 8. Spr i te Neb, o;:-k Fi l e Sys t~m 
3. Authentication, security and File Sharing Issues 
SKOS '.>;a s 6esignt,d tor u se 
ker:'l el S , o t" l ust i.;rp .:. i cit ':'y 
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t rus::. each o::.her .. r.  assump:: i on of ::.he SNOS "ysten i" 
that SKOS k ernel s trus:: each other and ne:: '.,;ork CO!11l~Un ica,_ i on8 
a.le no t dut'len::icated or encrypted 
SNOS provi d es fcr l ocation transpa rellt remo t e 
devices 'del l as fi l e s . High -,-,ork l oad perform~nce 
en:'1a:1ced ::iynamica l l y par::.itio:1ing 'dorkstation main memory 
into a Vl rtuo'll memo ry subsystem fi l e cache. SNOS 
u ::. rl r2e8 s;--,ared narr,e - spaci:lg allows for simp l i *::"ed 
migra::.ion bet''-'een servers and worksta::.-ior,s ane comrron 
use r v ie-,.;s at any 'dorksta::ion ' ... 'it~ i n ::.he netwo-tk. 
IBM AIX DISTRIBUTED SERVICES 
1. System Design Goals 
r E!') developed t:!!e .II. :X ::::riserin uted Services (AIX-OS) as 
co Llec t ion o f cii f::erent d1 st r 1 buteci for 
implementat ion on to:J of i ts AIX opera::.} ng system. 
AIX is a L emulc.tion of t~le UNIX opera ti n g system a Ld the AIX -
os utilizes an emulat i on of UNIX f i le sharing Other 
important are i ::s e f ficient support of l ocal database 
configurations and varied adminis L'c.t i ve d:'..s t ri.culed sys~em 
insta lla t ion CO!l !:::'gu:-atio:ls . 50 
2. Theory of Operation 
l>. IX - OS th e LJNIX rrnUll': me challis:n to remote 
:i l e c; and a 1 10';..15 :indiv::' dua l fi les ane di r ectories to be 
''' ibid, 89-90. 
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mount e d d i rect ly to a s et'ver wi thou~ ::.he requirement o f 
~ h 9 ent i re subt.ree Al l f~leo-, assumed 
to be a cce s s~ble and mo s ~ file oper&tio:1 S Dehave 
s ' milar l y l cca 1 
I'. IX - D5 uses a c lient - server r e lation sh i p v;he r e t h e 
cl i ent informs t h l' server at e a ch !' i l e o:;::>en i r_:J operat ~ on . If 
the fi l e i s accessed i n a r ead - on ly llude, th e n fil e cachin g is 
simullan eously to multiple clients . :f t he reques t ic; 
made [or on e cl ier-t read v,rite, lhen the :~ l e access i s 
asynchronous mode where .;:i l e cachi ng is enabled cn l y to 
t he wr i ter. A third mode, ';:\11 1 synchronal's, ~ s e na bl ed ''''hen 
multip l e c l i en ~ s ;::I'quire "niting lo a fil l'. I :: this si t uati o n, 
clie nt r l'ad - onl y cachi ng i s di s abl e d a n d f il e consio-,tE,ncy is 
ma i nta ined in a IT.anner simi l ar t he P,ndre,,' f" ~ le Sys t em . The 
seLver :>;:eeps ~rac k o f c~ l l clien t. open ings 0: its file a nd 
verifies the tiTT'e i t was modified . : t in f clIffis t he c l i ent s of 
t h e mod i fication, the c l i e nts t hen i nvalida t es the copie s o f 
the fi l es in can rece i ve t h e monifil'd copy. 
:lode 
3. Authentication, Security a nd Fi l e Sharing Issues 
AIX-DS is bosed on t h e SNA L"J6. 2 ;Jrotocol and c an 
Lle rroore commO:l ':'CP/ :P pro~ocol . cnc ryp~ .i.Cln fo r 
f or mu tual a u the::l ti cat i on is 
als o supported, as 'dell t.he KerberCls Ctl'then t ica t i on 
mech a n ismc; 
1)Mulliple dients A allowed to raquest file for 
read only replication (thus multiple clients 
allowed) 
2)File is transmitted for read only. (read only 
caching) 
3)Client B requests read/write operations 
5)11 mulUple clients want read/write, then read on ly caching to other 
clients is disablE!d. filE! oonsistenc:y is maintained by the server 
using a timestamp mechanism. last stamp gets cache. 
Figure 9. I BY. AIX Dist.ribut ed Services 
i'Jit. h ill th e network , user s and g roups uti l i z e hil 
iden t i fi ers AJ X- DS t r ansLotes t h ese into UNI X co:np a t i b l e 
mac::lun e spec i. fi::: 16 bit identi fi ers f or access oulS l de the 
l ocal n e two rk . 
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THE LOCUS DISTRI BlJTED OPERATING SYSTEM" 
Sy stem Des ign Goals 
LOCUS l3 a distributed UD era t :tng syst e I ~ 
designed Cot u e LI, u nder des igned to 
b e a net-,.,crk wide fi l e system 't.'i t:- t h e 
trans pare n t d a t a , aULQ:na tic: r epl i c:at icn an d 
di st ::: i ;:'ut. ed process e x ecut ions compat 1. ,:) l e 
The was d e'3l g ncd co s u pport , to O-a degree, 
n etwork t r anspc.rency t o ma.ke t h e separ-a,.e n et 'r.'u rk computers 
a ppear to t he C1sers dnd c cm,Jat ib l e a pp l icdt i ons a single 
machine of t h e sys t em f or fi l e ::: r eation or man i p u lation 
a nd ;J rocesses execution are f unct i onally Lohe same "dhether: l h", 
the l ocal l y or remo t ely. l.zany of r.ile 
f unct i ons of LOCUS ·,,-e r e d e signed tc b e ope ra t e d transparen t l y 
acrose; h et erogen e ous ma c h ines. 
:::mpor t ant the d e s i gn o f LOC u S i s the 
conduc ted ::m reccvery' iror:l f a il \J.res o f o f the sys Lem , 
sever" l the LOCUS functions deal vnth the 
p rocess o f f i le or sysLe:n recovery . 6 1 
6 5 
LOCUS Di 5 tric,-,t ed OJ:er<'l_ L i ng 
Volume 1 7 , N\J.rrWer 5. 
2. Theory of operation 
Th e LOC')S file i s a fU~lct i ona l superse t. 0: t he 
ee struc t u red tu rning system. I t ,;J1'e s e nts to 
s ingle nami ng :h iera r chy . The tree s t r uct ure 
cove r s a l l objects in the :1 1e c;ys tem al l o f t h e machines. 
I t i s imposs i ble to discern t h e particular l ocation o f th e 
obj e ct :rom its n ame alo:1e. This aspect mea:1S that 
aTe : ully transpa1'e:1l a :ld a l lm·1 :01' data a :1d p r og r ams to be 
:r.ov e d or execu t ed to and f rom di:ferent s i tes. 
3 Storage Site 2 
f--"=c::::.-~-:::-c-l - 0-1 "'~~ ... ~"'-~ ,"I1: ___ S_'ru_ct=c~---c-_ 
I ~:ne:'" ~=,-'~_ctc_~/P_h_Y'_"'_' I 
't • 
L~ 
l)Numerous copias are made available 81 each site. workstation raquests are SIlrviced 
from cIoSllS1S~ij providing high availability 
2)Si1e providas filo for read only Or read,lwJitG opal"!ltions 
3)Rsplicalion of files 11m dona on Iha stor3ga sil9 automatically villihg most moont timestamp 
Figure 10. The LJCUS F ile System 
Re p l icatlC:1 of ::lles i s pe-:: fo :·meo the storage s i t e s 
LOCUS au torr,atical ly e:1sure s all are up to date with 
access -;vade to th 2 re c;::: nt version. ;"' hi gh avai l abili ty 
' "ibic., pg 51. 
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i s assured the repl i cated ?errcrmdnce (or 
ret r ieval speed) i s enhanc e d ho.v ing the copies t he 
r equeS 1: lng e; in Gt.her i f the o!:: d fil e 
exis : on dif Eerer.t machin e s CJ.nd cap l es are o.vCl.-,- "- able 
t::c Se machines, the t G thuse :i l es are much t aster tt~an 
if t h e user h ad to access 0.11 t.lw f iles remotely. 
?ile r e plication is through multiple physica l contenDers 
fo r a log i cal f l le group .. ~ f ile bel ongi ng to a logical group 
IndY be s t::>:rcd any s ite ',,':here ther e is d physlcal conta iner' 
co rresponding lo that ;)roup . 
is designed so that eve!'y site .is a f u ll 
f'..:r:ctioni:lg no~e where [l l e operations tnCly involve mo r e t.hi).n 
cne host In a file 
t.Ile t~lree l cglcal si t es; 
1 . 'The Using site wh ich 
f lle . 
there can any combir.a ~. ion b f 
the request receives t:te 
3. Authentication, security and File sharing. Issues 
The basic approacr-, in LOCUS i s to 1Il2.1ntain a strlct 
arror.9 al l cop i es of a ::'_ e that c~ ny use r 
wrJQ sees t:--:tal fi:e sees on:y t he most cur:rent version , eVE'! if 
6"/ 
a con current u:?cale i s occu::-ri ng on a different machine . 
Co:? i es ma inta ined in a sinJ le :;Jart it i o n .. ,·i t". r: in t h e c;;ystem a re 
t:-:e pr.~ma ry sour ce 0: diE: i cJlty in th e proceso; o f 
rep l l ca t ioll . A copy eacr. part.lt. l on wil l ope r at e 
incependen t ly of t he othe r and ',,'hen t hey are merged, th e 
system \'.'i ll dJtomaticdl l y r econc i le the da ta whic h :i t 
',lIldersta nds, : :: it cannot reconcil e , the p roblem i s :: lagged t o 
a h ighe r level, \.lsually a system ac.minic;; t ra tor or to the 'clsers 
\'1[10 in t.eract i vely merge tbe co:t=:ies . 
i 3 a high ];er:ormance net",·oork I: ranspa r ent. 
d i str i buted fi l e system 'iihich has s\.lccess:u l1y been run in a 
s i nglp adminis t rat i ve domain witll all t he si t es supj:::orte c in 
close cooperation , Thi s type o f coopera t-i on is 
small locali zed net","o r k bu t may b e di f fi::::'Jlt to a chieve with 
a b roader, large area, :i le sha ri ng net\<Jork utilized by 
arbitrarj at. ot.her si t.es where t here i s no c;;iIlgle 
a:irni n istrati'/e a ut-horlty to control the ent i re system. Also, 
general secur i ty i ssues, ot h el: than tho se ,,;hich ar e p r Qv:i.c.ied 
by a basic UNIX i n s t al l ation, '",ere no t consi6.erec in t he LOCUS 
sys t. em 
I mp lement at:i.o;l 0 : inc:US i s base d on a peer -to-peer 
Ilet',vo::: k moc.el. Repli c Cis a r e updated at & s ingl e repl l ca t- i on 
sile, which then n ot. i f ies ethe r" repl icat e d c;;it es ot a pending 
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Se rvice Fer 
on Netwcrks 
'::'hese repl icas 3re then upda t.e d a synchroneusly from 
t. h e f i l::"st r eplicat.::,oll site. 
PROJECT ATHENA AND KERBRROS 
1 . System Design Goals 
Kerberos is a tru ste d th i rd parly a ut h enti c a t i on 
f er open C8mput e r sys tems an d net·,-Iorks . 
deve l.oped by proJect llthena in at t he ,>1assachusetts 
I nstitut e o f 'I'e chn8 lo'?i and tu nded pr i mar:d y DEC and I BM. 
I t. is designee: to be added int.o a:1Y ex .i. sting net '\\'ork protocel. 
a l though il has been general l y use d ',·, i t h t he UNIX oriented 
prolocols s u ch as "\.JPS 
'::'he system is :::ensic.ered tr ust e d i n the sense t. ha t 
each o f the users believe Kerbercs'3 i dent ificat icn 0: (-~ a ch of 
the ot.her users accuTate. I t provides mut ua l authenticat i on 
betv-.'een users 8n an open local area net1:1crk 
Des ign g8als i nc luded no cleci~- tex t t:~ansmi ss i on of 
paSS1:.'o::::c.s or p l aintext p assv-.'o rd s torage 8n s e:cvers , minimiz e d 
exposure of cl ient and server keys '"he::::e comprorr,i ses cnly 
aftect th e current and limited J::;c:t ::-e-usabl e 
au'Chentica tion lifetine. It d e 5ignRd t o b e t:-ans p arent to 
t h e use:: a nd r equ i re5 ninima l rno d ificatlon e xi5t i ng nel'wor k 
c'l;:p::.icatic1l5. " 
2. Theory of Operation 
KerherC!o;; u o;;es D2S and every user mai n t.ain s a p rive.t e 
k ey. It use s cryptoqre.phic kn own as ' t icke t s" pro tect 
t he secur:'- t y o f meo;;3ages s e nt in and ou l t he comp'J r_ er 
o;;ys t em . Pass\.'.'o r ns are ne'ler transmit tee resi ee ~n a hi q h ly 
secure !'lachine called a server . It performc; authe n t ication 
cn login and n elwcrk r equests. 
fl_i ~;~=;:'~:~~~~;:=:~ . J_ " '.",£owe ,.,H" .'co • "e,", ,., 
priva t e key. Upo n Iece i pt, JOIleJ dec rypts 
I Kerberos I 
P:::;P . AI'I' . This ticke': is doclJly onc~ypted by 
p rivate key then again tor Jr:IlC3 in ,Tones' 
the tid<e ~ u~ir." her private key 
]) Jc"es sends the lI.utbcntication Licket 
,.0 POP.JUlP, "'hie::" dec'ypts the tick"t 
u~iIlg i t J pIivatc k"y. 
Figure 1.1.. '< erbe r os Autrlentlcd t iun Scheme 
In cperation , Use r I I makes a c lear text request f ~)Y an 
autl1ent i catJ..on t~cket fcr a partic'J l ar serv ice f rom Kerheros 
Kerberos rep l ies G. ti cke t for t l-',!l.t service w!lich is 
encrypt e d fic:; t hy the :o ervice's priva te key and then by User 
A 's Il r i vate User A rece i v es tI, e t i c1,; e t, h e (lecrypls 
~t -clsing hi s p r ivate key and send ,_he eicket the requested 
'dhich t hen perfcnns a flna~ decl::",'pt i on 
privat e key I f che f ined decy-yptio:l not in ehe prope -:--
rO::'rJ , t h en 0"ser A i::; authencicaccd (all inv0 1 i d key :' a Ed 
t he s erV.1c e is n::>L reEderec. . In th i s process, a '..lt he:lt i c: a :: ic r'. 
ever sending a pas:o;word 
It s up;Jcrt s UNI X, Uacintesh aEd DOS .1rnp lernen t aticms 
Au thenticat ion , Security and File Sha r ing Issu es 
Kerberos' strengths are its exee.::-nal adapta Di l i ty to 
heceroqeneeucs t raEsrnin:eci, a:ld it 
provl,d e s f or a l rcls :ed, s ing ~ e centra ~ ized aut:lenticatien 
authorit':i for a loca _ net'.vork. Ie ::ll:-evenes replays of client 
O'!.nd provides f cr e: da '_a encrypt:ion 
and can d etect a Serec.ffi modificati;m by 
an u ntrLlseed By prev~d~ng cl ient c.nd se r ver viith 
ml':c.al ~y agreed upor, sessioE key s , i t a1 1 0'.'.'s fer a limited 
secure date: f ~ o' ... ,. 
:-Ic \"ever, Kerbero::; does not 0.1 10 '.-.' fcc pl:evene.1Or'_ o f 
d i c t ionary of pass",'c r ds or have 
pceve nt users froCT'. S:lar ing f rom o t he r u sers. I t . 
dces EOL prevent t:te den.1a l cf seJ::vi c f> a t tac-:k ared doe s 
\-.. ork efficiently in a .;',. rea Networ': {WAN) envircnmen t . :t 
was des i gned dirpct l y fer: ~ oca 1 area netwerk au thent~cat ion 
ared not_ fer glebally d.1scributed file sha r ing a utheJ~ e icO'!.ticJ!l . 
I t prevides fer nQ encryption cf data e 1 ectr.or. ~c ma .1 1 
transmi ssio n. Al so , it do e s no t provide fo r pasc,',,'o r d 
v alJ.oat i on o f lndlv i dual wor!,;: sta t ion s . 
THE FICU S DI STRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM 
1 . Sy s tem Design Goals 
Th e F i cus Di strlLut e o 2i le System' S i s a f i le 
rep l ico.ting f or t h e UNIX env i r onme n t i ntended for u s e 
i n a v e:::y l a rge , wide a :::ea ne t work . I t emp l oy s a n opt i ;ni s t 1. c 
' on", c opy ava llab i l i t y · mode l whe re c on f lic ting up da t e s tc a 
f i l e s y s tems di r ecto r y i n f o rmati o n aut oInQ. tic a l ly 
r econc i l e d a n d con fli c t i n g fi l ", mod i fi cat i on s are =-eliab l y 
de t ected a nd r e port e d . Th e sys t em a r c hi t ec t u re i s b a sed on 
s t ac !,;: a b l e l aye r s which r;erm:;'t a h i gh c eg re e o f modu l a r. :::' ty and 
ex tens i b i ll ty o f f il e sys tem 
"'ac h us er- vi sib l e f1. l e , there 
r ep l i ca s o f. th e f i l e s t or e d a n d ma i n t aine d t r.ansparent l y 
t_he us er F i c u s, upon a u s e r requ e s t , -,,'il l aut omat i ca l l y 
s e l e c t a r.ep li c a to t,e rvi c e the =-e c;:u e s t and propag a t e a ll 
rr,o d i f ications to the r e p l i cas. Fi cus wil l a lso ma int a :::' n a 
t r ac k on wh 1.c h rep l 1. c as need up dat i n g if t h ey are i n it ia l l y 
u n a v o. il a bl e , for aut_oma t i c upda tl n g vioen t hey d e become 
a v a l l a ble . 
-C' i c u s ,,,' :O s d eveloped und e r ARFA contrac t No . 
OC72 . 
F i le 
2 . Theory of Operation 
Ficus 1S cl d i str ibul e d f ile systt;m designed to r un cn 
DeH Y. nel'lmrY.. systems ra Il J 1 ng from portable un l ts and 
viorkscati on s to large file servers 
Fic;us providC'!s fOT volwne rep l ica t1on. A fi cus volume 
1 3 a col l e:::t. i on o f files and direct o ries vi]-:lCh ar e managed 
toge1l1er and form a suhtree of the ~lNJX n arrespac e. Each 
logical ficus voh,me i s represenled by a set of vo l ume 
repl .1cO'!s \;,'h i ch form a co l l e ction of "conta :'-ners" [or file 
replicas _ Files and c.irectories ,,;iL"lin t h e 10Jicai vo l ume 
rep J i.ca t ed :1:1 more of t:-,e vol ume repl1cas Each 
individua l vo l wne repl ica is norma l l y 
pa r tit10n 
i n one UNIX 
Ficus a llO'"s fcc vo l ume l ocation informat-ion b:{ 
fragmenting t ile in f orm3.tion npedec to locat-e the volume 
t h ro ugh a specialized pointer in l:le volume 
point _ A graft point maps a set of volume f i le 
host-. The a private table volc.:ne 
replicas to a specific s t orage device. Tllis t_ype o f 
ccnficurat.ion al l o'ds specific vol1.L'lle ::eplica 
' -:orma:..ion tc be stored and a ccessed where i t i s most nee ded, 
rat_her than using a la rge, monoli t hic 
e ach site. 
:nount_ t3.ble at 
HOST 
Ficus File Storage 
~G~m~p_h~~~;"~t __ -,l~------_~ 
Private Table I.) 2 
I)Volume location information is oontajnBd in a graph point which maps 
volumeraplicastoahost 
2)The host maintains a private Slorl'(le tabla which will map the votume to a 
storage S~9 
Figure 12. Logica l Ficu~ Vo l ume Set oc:- Conta i ne ~· 
A F i:::us gra f t poin t may rep l i ca ted li:-: e any t il e or 
direct o ry in c. "v"o l ur.:le . Vo l ume rep l icas may be created 
or destroyed as long a s t.he targe t vo lume r epl~ca and t he 
gratt n:;plica a r ~ avail a81 e in the UNI X par t it icn, \,:h jch 
enforces L'le concept o f ·on e copy ava~ labil i ty. · 
F~cus supports a very high c.vajlab i l ity :or bu t. h r ead 
and ':.'r i te a n d a110· ... "s ;"or u:1coo::-d i nated upd Ctt i ng whe n a t .leas t 
one of th e rep l i cas of the f i l e ar e Asyn chronous 
u pdat.e p r opagation prov i ded tc copies un a bes t 
eftort bas is bUl is re1 =-ed upen ':: cr 
d. =- s3emi:1at ~ons . F ~cus prcv=-d es for 
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r eco n CJ. l :' a t. i e n " 
f or 
and 
al l .cep l icas ',·; i ll a c cessed 
and converged t. o a COffir":1on stale . i n othe r words , th e 8O': c,eil t ia J 
e l eme" .. ~s of r eplica c o n sJ.s t ency strat.e;r.l J '_e 
'vi ~ t h i n the Ficus reconc il i at i on alg orith.'Tls 
even t_uc ~ mu ( ua l 
po~nt. .cepJ i cas 
Worl<sl8tion 
Client 
all fi;' e, a~ rect_ ory , 
l)ThacliontrequestsaoooporlsaCO!lYof to.fwsfilofor 
2}ModiflC!l!ions made tel 0I1Q copy , fil<l closed and modi:ication~ 
am inoorpClr8tadby host tel all aVl'li lllbla mplicas 
3)PeriodicroconciJiation is pariormedwhlln mplia llodf. 1lS 
which were unllvailabla earlier are now available. Conflicts 
llrorosolwd lIuton11'tticaily or\hrough to. syStilm IIdministrtlltlr 
Figure 13. F~cus F :l ~ e Mo di : icat ions 
g r.-. :t_ 
Be ca use o f the asy nc h ronous n a!...t.;re o f the p r opagation 
~~trategy op t_imisr_ic one copy ,,-va i la c i:" it.y poli cy , 
update propo ga t_ions o f dif f erent. r e plicated f i cus fil es 
can oome i n t o conflict . l'. conflic'~ occ u :::-s when 
replica ~~ r ece i ve update s ',·! i t h8u[ s'.l c c essfully prop a ga t_ ::.n g 
t heir u pdat e s '~ o other rep lica s. Genera~~y, con f ~i cts are 
automat. ~cally r: e t_ e :::t_e r: and reconci lec. , b u t thcse ccnfl i c ts 
75 
t~e system cannot reconci le are automatically b rou ght to 
t h e atten t i o n or l:hp ov.'ning user f o r r pso l u l iorl . 
The repli ca tion s ervice o f F ~c us is pa c kaged that. 
i t may be inser t ed dbove t:he base UNIX file sys t e m on any 
mach~n e runr]).cg a '3 t ac k abl e t i l e i n terr a ce ':"h is s t a c kable 
I dyp~ approach to fi l e c.e s ign p e rm:" t s adding 
runc~ion21 i t y t o il n px is t lng system by wr. i t iTl<; 2dd i tiond l 
cDde , bu t not chang ing any o f t. h e e x isl i ng code in the 
ope r al ing system 
I Application or Operating I System (Kerenel Calls) 
I 
Ficus Logical Layer 
(Interface Containers 
01 Volumes) 
I SUN Network File Sys (for Transport 10 Ditferenl 
sites) 
Figure 14. F j cus S t ac ka b le L2.yer ITl t erface 
F icus cons i st s c f two l ayers ; a phys ica l l ay e r whi c h 
suppor t s tllose oper2. t l::ms involving a singl e rep l i ca o f a 
fj leo and 3 lcgical : 'ayer which s uppo r ts opera t io~ s whlcn 
or t h e F1CUS 
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invol v e a. ll t h e rep li ::: as o f a file . The UN I X Ne tv..'o r k ?i le 
(UF3 1 in the l a yer co li10ve ?i c\.l s 
re :Juescs f rom o n e s~te to another. 
3. Authentication, Security and File Sharing Is sues 
The mai;l advantage o( the stackable tl le l a Y8:: s used 
? icus :" s thut ot h er UNIX s er v i ces can by c:sed in 
conJunct ion with ch i s system. Se rvic e s c an b e a.dded or d l:?leced 
by insertl.ng t he add i. tional sys t em f u n cLion into che 
opp~'oprlate Ficus a lso supporls fi le encrypl.lOn an d 
compre~;s ion of fi l es and d irecto r i es 
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF REVIEWED DISTRIBUTED FILE 
SYSTEMS 
As t he s h u.·m ch ere 
ma ny G1 str i but e d f i .l e sys c em l echnologies, each .. ; i th it s 
8f concentration dependi ng on t h e goa 1 0: the parcicul ar 
des.lg n. Mos c syslems on a p e er t o :;) ee r a c l :i.en t ise::ve r 
rel a tionshir. 5' ile t"ep l i cation e icher che 
cl ienl i v.'O Lkstac i c n or l eve l . Mos t systems ucil :"z e 
a cOffi;Jar ison of t:i. l e c:i.me", t amps f or tile consistency. 
Availab ility :'ncorporaled throu gl1 t h e u ~;e o f severa l cop:... e :o; 
l ocated i n mul tip l e servers o r mUlt iple .:::-igh~_ s (fl l e 
loc :<..i n g t8 r monif :" catio?1C', and concur:::-e n cy cO:1 t :!:'ol r e ad-only 
a c c ess) to speci f ica l ly connect ec. files. Eac h has the 
basic £ oa l o f distribut ing , sharing, and repl i ca ting fil e s or 
director i es as wel l as maintaining fi l e a ';ailability and 
COnSl.stency . 
li.ddit i ona l concerns incorporating these systems in to a Do:! 
o r gan i zatio n ·~iere t heir abili t ies tel i mplerr.ent da c a ser-uriLy 
E1e asures . Se c u rity, usua l ly an a f ter t ho\lgh t of most C1\/ i lian 
cr i e n ted ap;::Jli ca tio:1s, pr lmar'J r oo f\l n ct i on a l 
r e qu i rement. Informat i cn fl c; .... in t h e DoD, the pr iva t e sector, 
and other Fede ral asencies has become incre a.s ingly 
sophist l cate d. Any secur ity breach ','1i t hin a n organ i zat :ion can 
h av e cat_d st ro:;:Jh ic ef f e cts on the function o f the o r qa niza ti on 
and i t s enviro n:nen t 3 S a I>lhol e. For exam:;::l e , a n e cdotal 
evid~nce sugge sts, lha t i f Bank o f Arr..e rica' s compu ter systems 
were t o be dC"1ll for 2 day s the bank '.'1ouln fol d a nd t he econ o:ny 
of Ca l iforni 2 as I>ie ll as t he Uni ted States be c rippl ed. 
In lhe ;::Jreced.i:1g secl i ons, i ss~es di5cussed I>lere 
identi f ied as the :nore popu l ar industry s ta n da r cs for secur i ty 
c.n d encr-yption. The Digita l EncJ::YIl c ion St andard {D ES) , 
and t he S1.:; i~ jack a 1 goritrrt are at th~ fo r efronl o [ established 
encry p tion technology. Fi rel-lall sy~t ems an d tcchnologles f or 
aUL h ellt i cation a nd aceesc;; control. s ucr. as t. h fC :-<erberos ticket 
granting sys ~em , C.re beco:ni :1g pop ular 2.S c;; ecurl ty enhancements 
t o established networks. 
objective o f t he Corpora LfC :!:nf o rmation Managemen t 
::'n -it i at i v e ",·ithin the 000 is to C8rrLo i ne t he :")fC St of a ll 
current l y ava ila bl e sys t ems int. o one E. r ch i tec t l.ire \O.lh ':"ch ~vould 
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e n sure ::he widespread disLribut.Lon of fil E::' 5 
\·,hi : e simul::a,,'~ou c;ly ensur i ng secure 
'-- :1 t e g r it.y o f the ::c :fcrmaLion . The goa ::' 
O:1€ s'{ stem Do D \-Jl de '.·'ocld provide f or mutLa.l u s er 
au thent lca:: ion , valida ;::ion, non-repl:::- ic.tion t h ::oc:.gh 
dlgital signo.ture and pass\oIord t echno locries . The DoD s'{stern 
c,hould s'-lpport distr ibu ted :i le functions 
avcllabi l ity, r a;;Jid replicat i on, and fil e co n s i stenc::·- and 
CO:"1C1.l1:Te ncy _ Fl n al.1y, th e syst em shoul ci also employ root leve l 
t r ansmission secur':'ly fealur ef, wh ich provide f o r peer to peer-
data encr.ypt i on/ciecryption in a user transparent format. 
t hes e desired feat,nEs be fo --.:, nd in the 
TRGFE' ::' ES llTlp lementation wh i ch 
clstributed fil e system I-Jit h 
enhanced mall (TIS/PE11) 
a hybrid of c_he 
au grnentatlon of pr ivdcy 
IV . TRUF F LES 
Thi s chapt e r discusses the character i st.ics of Olle I>.'ide 
area distributed file sys t em , the Tn:.s t ed Flle Sy s tem 
(TRUFFLES in rela t ion to t he f i na l r-esearch question : .. ,That 
SeC Gr e di s t ribG t ed fil e syC',t. em CGIT ently available can b e st 
: I t the c.eeds a t the OeD? Ec",! c a n i t. be imp l G:ne nted in t o all 
exi stin g net,,-ork syslem ; sp e cifically, int8 t h e :- let ..... ork a t t he 
Navi'i l P8s t g:t:'i'idGat e School? Discussed a r e i ts assoc iate d 
archi tectu:- e and a genera l theory ef opera t. i on. Also di s c l~ssed 
are ~ ssues concerning hO'.,; ':'RUFFL2:S t o overccme t he 
i ssues ef authent ica t i on , securlty, acd fil e sha ring 
methodol8g i es a man ner d ifferent than pre v i ously 
distributed ti l e systems cr s ervices. 
DIS TR I BUTED FILE SYSTEMS AND TRUFFLE S 
As ·,,-.'e appr8ach nation- wide i nteg ratier. o f co:nputer 
systems, it is clear that : i l e rep l icat i on ",'il l playa k ey 
ro l e. bOlh to improve data availabil i t.y in the f ace ot 
f a i l '-.:res, and to i mprove per f8 cmance by l ocat i ng data 
I>.'here it used to 
stClt e c earlier, t he d i st:-ibut i on, :-8;'Jliccition , and 
shar. i ng 8f files b e t\,'een L.sers in d i:fe r ent administrative 
" Imple:T1eEta t ion o f the F icuc; 
JUIle =-- 990 . 
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d ell'ai n s i ~3 requ.Lrec the DoD . With the w(~ igh t 
1~Ler31.ly we~g~llng dm"n sh~ps. an example of t hls l s t he USS 
'T iconceroga c l ass !'-eg i s crui"ers ,·:hieh carries o ver 
72 . 00 0 pounds e f p a per . Thi s trans.l2teS ::-:::'0 al r _'Jst 1 , 8 0 0 
cub i c fe e t cf space Br LJ,; ing hard copy daLa into dn 
operat ional are:-:a is o:ten in!eJsilJle, therefore , the dig J ~_ al 
tra ns fe r o f .Lnformation i s Cl v i ab l e a l te r:-:a Ll ve to p0.per 
ori e nted systems a reo;u l t , many uni t s have initiat e d a 
move f rom paper publicat ions t o diglta l teehn8!ogy, such as 
CD - ROl--l 
Paper pub l i cation modificat i ons are often compl~ cated. 
eonfusir,g , and t o implement , resulting in scve r c. l 
vers ions of ouLdated "c urrenL copies ' main t c.ined in the users 
librarit's. 
1tll th d lst ributed flle s y stems. a" impor tant do c ument can 
bt' updated at one site and tht'n p r.opagated or rt'p lieated to 
al l other si.t es ·,,'h~re the document almost im:nediately 
and ,tlith littl e need Lo int-_erf ace \>Iit-_h the loca l user. ,·;hen 
local us",!:' retrieves t h e do c ument. they wil l be noti f i e d 
of any pending :ncdi t.icaLions and t ake appropr i ate aet~on, 
either replace ·,·, l th t he new updat.e , do not_ replac e , or keep 
~he of in f ormation s e c'.lr .!. t.y 
discuss ing trans f erring data over an untrusted , or COIT.mon 
me d ia One so':' u t lon is to encrypt. the data at end u ser point s . 
reoccurr ~ng quest~on :13 in authenc_iealing and 
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valica ting t he end user for data lransmissicn. A solut ion tc 
t hi ;:; :? r ob l em is to i :1ccrporate a mu tua l a uthenticat i on 
ceL t i:.lcation rr,ec haL i sm, a "handshak; e " prior tc encry.r; t e d 
dat a trans f e r 
impleme n tatioL t hat ha s been success:u l 
i n corporatiw; the p revious l y descr ibed fe atures is TRUF FLES 
:TRns t ed Fic us Fi:"E System) . '!'RUFFLES ~s a UNIX supported 
cornl; i'la t i on o f Privacy Enhanced l·lai l (PEW, a n d a n enc:::yption 
e r.hanc e d ver s i on 0: the ;:;-icus u is tri h u t en f i l e systeill. The I'EH 
p r ovide s the "ha nd s h ake" a mong a nd the d i str i bu te s 
th e fi l es secu r e l y . '!'RUFFLES al lol-is for : ile updates as l ong 
as a t leas t one re;;Jl ica 0: t hp file is availabl e some \" h e re in 
the '::'RI;FfL:;:S sha nd n e t . 
'::'he ll n ique aspect of TRUFFLES is tha t 
enhancements have been incorporated int::> t h e cverall nes i gn. 
The underly ing r;remise o f most secu -::e wide area :L.e s ha r i ng 
system models ar e to couple a generic pr i vacy e nhan c ed ma i l 
i :nplerr,en t at i on to any gener i c di str i b uted file s yst e m fer the 
s ecure tra n s f e r o f data. 
TPiJPP LES u ses Trusled Info~'mat ion Sy s t em's PEB (TI S /PEN) 
wh i ch aULhen l i c aLe s and e n c ryp ts electroni c ma il {using RSA 
e ncrYPt i on) to eslab l ish tJw "hanc.shdke " b e t .. leen users, to 
deteJ::mi:-H~ tha~ a re l a~ ionsh ip d esi r ed , ann t h e n ~o 
authent~cate t h e w:;ers in the re l ationship . m2 il 
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a l so Lhe of recpptioll fai l u r e at dec,t i nation 
by rEe ti:J.~liS' i. ng conCi'J.(::~. wheIl a si: e funct i on i no 
es t i:J.i:; ~ ishes encrypt i on keys for 
r elat i o n sh ip_ After the have kneen establic:hed th e 
trllsted portion 0:: the tdkes over a:1d hand:"~o, 
the file transfer protocols. 
F":. t e r t he h a n dshake ha s i"s tab l ishe d bet-,."ee n the u sers 
Ficus '''' i l l build the "volu:ne " . A volume is s inilar to the 
conc e pt of a UNIX f ile syste:n It consi s t s of a connected 
tree - l ike st r u ctu r e o f directories and f i l es all storec on a 
s ing l e physical Any fl I es tha t a re to be reo]:: l i.cated 
ITi.!St be c ol lectec in t o 0. v olu:11e or set of 
e:lsures the volume of ',."ill automa t ically 
identical v olume tor t he ot h er u s er- 8( user-s _ 
This " fr e e rel ec~s es control of the s y stem fro:n 
th p sys lem administrators in area s concerning '.·!hich of t he:.. r 
files dre to be shared, by ,,,,'hom, and whom . 1'his is 
a probl e m that h as been adnressed; cther ',,1Ords, qlJ.estion i ng 
·,."hat pOllCics shoc.ld bp. es tabl i" hed cOEcerninJ the sha r i ng of 
lrus ted, sensitivE' i nfOI"Ina t lon. 'TRUF"F'LES refers to a. pol ic" 
module during the handshake to determine if the syst:em "'!il l 
permit t r.e r- elat ioLship . The sys t em nc.:lTu Li st rat 8 r wi l l set 
the prmiide d po l icy rned\...le" This procedure ocec.r s at both 
end s of the rel a t i onsh i t:. 
FILES/VOLUMES 
I n eacr. system's h ler- an.:by trcen:' is a partition between 
TRUFfL2S f iles non-TR UFF LES fl i es. T!"'.e fiJes ste r eo. cnder 
t he nu rmal u;·r:L X fi le sys t em are unable to 
f ile::; On ly TRUFFLES volu:nes k e l lee tion of d i rector i es 
files) can be sr.axed with otLe r TRUFfL:t; S v oJume s This is a 
aspect to t h e posi tive s e cLrity impl i cations of 
Figure 15. Fil e Hlerarchies Using Trc.ffles 
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Wi t. h in the ':'RUFFLES port:"on or t.he fi le h ierarc:',y shown in 
Fi guL"e 15 , t ;"1t> volume s;"1 ar i ng l imi t.a t :"olls a re i~ '.:.stro.t ed by 
the shade G. tr ia."":!g les The, t ·,vo do not 
f or example, t he r oot at 
':!h ~ le th e root. ') t Na val Pos tg raduat e Sch ool " h" 
HO',,;8ver, some p u.ctions at the namespooc e ar e shared. 'C'~le 
':'RUF"F LES volume oo t UCL.;>"s global/us/edu/cc /share~ it ha.c; a 
.rep l ica at t-.;ava l Postgrac.uate School h/us/mil/ee/share~it 
De s pi te the lwo rep l icas b eing st.o r e d a t different p l aces i n 
the h :i.erarchie:,; TRUFFLES k e eps a l l ri l es in the replicas 
consis tent. S:"tes are permitted to co:nple t e l y share identica l 
'l'RIJF?LES narrespaces . ,< The pOL·tion of the narrespace not 
shared bet'.',leen UCLA and NPS is not accessi b le to rerrote sites 
t hrough TRUFF LES. For exarrple, at NPS n ot oo hle to 
see UCLA's volume global/us/edu/cc/lab , and cannot use 
it , 
In f3 Ct., t:.he 'Jcl ume share~ 
the only group of files t ha t 
t o both TJCL". aue: NPS. 
D. TRUFFLES ARCHITECTURE 
TIS/PEM 




Figure 16 . TRUF FL ES ll.rchitecture 
The User Int er f ace interacts with ei t her t be Ficu s anc/or 
t h e TIS/PE1>l po:t: t ions of TRUFF LES. It also with the 
poli cy module for l ocal system ad.:ninistrator contro l s, such as 
shar i ng. ',,'hen off s i t e transporT i s requi r ed tr.e sys tem c alls 
<;0 th rough TI S/ PEN. TIS /PEI-I secure l y transpo r t s request s to 
the TIS/PEN insta l lat i on at tLe other s i te , t r.en e i ther 
calls t he ",ppropriate Fi.cu s rout i ne or p",sses the request up 
throug h lhe user i nter f ace . " During normal operations. 
TRUFFLES requests pass through Before goi n g off si t e , 
the requests pass t hrO'.lgh i den t ifier (UID ) ma.p p ing 
8(, 
l ayer fo r t he i n t or:nation on th e destination's The 
':'EU::O FL:2S r equest s a 1 so LhrO:..lgh trans;;cor t securi ty. 
T I S/ PEM ARCHITECTURE 
~ail and Other Interfaces 
... .. _ .... _ ... ..... ... .. ... =::1=.== 
. K ey Mgt ~Utilities I 
L ... J..~~~.~.~ ........... . 
Figure 1 7 . T IS / PEp.j In~. erface Arc hiLec t u:c e 
ElectroC!ic Ma i l or other interface services enter t ae PE!>l 
sy stem tilroug h a g ateway i r. the PEE l i ~ rary. 'Pile ?EM lib rary , 
PEM ut.i l ities, and Key l--1a n age:r.ercl ]; r og cams al l cOITL"Tlunicate 
·,.,.ilh a :1 individ ual designated as the Local Key Ma ll a g er ( LKl1). 
Trle LKM ma i nta i ns a local database [8r certifJ.ca t es a:1d 
as s oc.i.ated privat: e The p::-ivate 
lhe cr'.lPto l ogical l ibrarles as "Wel l , a n d general :"i.bra r J.es al l 
t.he .lnf(n ma t i OE r epos i t. o ry fo r t he LY]-1 . -:'hese t h ree 
lib.::' a ry modules co n ."OtanLly inte rac t wi t h each other Lo prov iae 
fer a smoothly functional imp leme:1ta t ion 
PRACTICAL I TY OF INSTALLING TRUFFLES AT NPS 
The TRUFF LES svstem a bs tractly, the Fic;.lS distr ibut.ed 
fjle sy;;tem c: ombn:: ed ,,' i t h a Di gital Encrypt i on Star:dard (DES} 
algorith.'11 and i mp l emented i :l the ker:1e l of S~nOS versicn 4.-
','!l1icl1, as of thi s writing, is abcJUt 3 ye a rs o l d . D:l e t o t ile 
4.1 ope:::'ating system kerne l izat.ion 0: TRUFFLES, i t was deemed 
impractical to in;;tall th e T'RUFFLES system Naval 
Postgrad:late School at the prescnt t ime . F~ l t'J c e :lpgra des of 
T:-l.UFFLES wil l ce i ncor porated i nto more rec e r: t UNIX operatinJ 
systerr ver;;ions ann then the i lfpleG1e:1fa tion NPS may be more 
p ract.ica l . ':'l1e spec i :ic di f ficulties of i mp l err.cntatioll 
revolve around ins t a ll ing a:l. 010. opera ting systea'. on t he NPS 
system ',,'hicI! has had at l east 5 upgrades sinc e .s~1I10o; 4. -
fi scal concern also p lays a ro l e . f or t he TRUFFLES 
deve l opment team to bui l d the i mp l eme ntation they needed 
permisc::ior:: to '",'crk in the UNIX opera t ing system kcor ncol T:'li s 
cos t t h e dE-velopmer::t $20, 0 00.0 0 in =-991. The cost t.o 
'Jtlqrade t o a moder.n oper:at i ng sys t err. carr b e expected to higher 
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TIS/PEM INSTALLATION AT NPS 
1. Numeroc:s document at.ion and l ic e ns i ng files. 
This is MH ver-s ion G.7 wi t h the TI S/Fa·] 
copy 8f t he RA. SRE? 
c o nt ains al l of the 
':'he actL:al insta l lat i on 'fIS i 9EM involved fi r- st beild i ng 
t he RS.A.REF l ibrarie s and h les This p r oc e ss fair l y 
s tra::"ght forwdrd is supporte :i ","e ll J.n the dO",,"nlo a deo. 
docc:mentation . Upon successfu l comp l etio:l 0 : t h e RSA::<'EF 
t h e -:'IS/ FEM direct.ory , l ibr.aries, a :1d 
f ::" l es ",e r e built .. l. t th j s p8i:lt the system c8ul d h ave been 
cO:1 t igured, 'with f ::" lters, to \.:se almost any r:Lail user agent. 
Si:1ce th e intenti8:1 I'ias to the provided ::<.a:1d NH t ocl, t he 
;Jrov ideo. fi le mh6. 7 uti l i z ed fo r t his p c:rp c se . 
Til e e n t ire inst a ll atio:1 8 E TIS/ PEH readily 
a c comp l i s h ed ',·: i t11 the m8st dif f iculty encountered i:1 the 
buildi:19 of the message ha:ldler t.he'l'ISiPEt-1. Ev(?n though 
thi s impleme :1t a tio:1 was b e:i It i :1tO t.hemail user agent, s ome 
additio:lal system con f igura t i on wa s necessary . Th is mos t ly 
invo l ved con f igur i.:lg th(? 
req'.:iren ent s. Of t.he 2 4 f i les that c01..:10. ha v e bee:1 cO:1 fi gured 
f rom [he d e fa u lt v alues. , only 4 requi:::eo. mino::: mod i ficat i on 
f or the syst em. 
'::'h e sp e cific ti':'e s e r_at were rec on f igured '~Ie , e tr_e 
codmlnic; e,ative 
lhe NP S 
Af: e:: co. ins t a:C l atiOrl o f. PKV:, there was some 
difficul ty in c onfiguring the system f o r us e r r:ertitl.c ate 
The system admini st ::ato:: the Cert if ica ee 
Admi ni st r a e or) ab l e to crea ee h i s O'..m ce r ti ficate as e he 
user s g -,"ide direc t ed. HO'dever, 'dhen a ny other' dt:_eIl'pt ed 
to c r ec.t e a ne,,'- cer t.-i ( i edee, the s ystem ·wo'J. l d firs t ch e ck to 
disc e::- n if t he user held a current ce.ctiflcate ard f o un d that 
th e us e r alreaGY r.e:Cd a c'J.r.ren: ee.c: i ficate. 
lYlvestigalion Uns ,eveal e d t hat t h e 
c crti :-ieate each \.15e1' had lhe Ce c l i ficate }I.drnin i stra:or's 
cer: ificae e . Th e corr-eclior. to this prohlem t-,lrned oue t o be 
a s:!.Inp l e ovc r. s i ght o n t: ce ins t a:C l ation, sr,:eeificdl l y emittl r,g 
the "comne ntHlg marke r t o ::'-emoving t he RE!cI 
in DOS batch f i l es ) of t he "'J_"ccess " file th3. t 
configure d to ,,110w U5e::'-5 c o ha v e t he i y own c: e rcificates . The 
sys t em the n ':) er f Qrmed ac.ver t :...sed. Also, 
in f ormat :... on rernoved f r om t h e cerc i f ica ce c o a llow f or more 
e ffi cien t use. 
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de f inec a d i str.1but ec. f il e system 
allo-,.,. s fo r sLar i ng a nd repl icat ion o f 
files u =:.il i z ing end to enc encrypcioIl acroo.c;; ? ',,,ide 
a l og ical se t of func tJ. ona l 
COElponen t s and not me re l y as a set o f connected compu t.er 
The qual it ie c;; and t e chnolog i es we f ee l a 
d istr i b u ;:ed f i l e sys tem sl:ould h ave dre consi stent l y r-. i gr-. da t a 
availabil ity. s ys tem re l ia ::J i li t y, repllcat iun con<:":urrency, 
f i le rccon r::" ll a ti o n, a uthpnt ica tion and validatlon of 
seaml es s user in ter fac e, securi t y r: a p&bi l iti es, open 
sys t.em i nt e gration t o comply c urre nl s t an da rds. 
\',e ha v e rev ievvec. e leven ciislributed s y s tems Qr serv i c es 
·.-lith e ac h havi ng a part .:.c u la r design g oal . Eac h s y s tpm h0d the 
basi c goal of dis =:.ri buting , shari ng, and rep l icating f iles and 
di rect orie s a s -,,'e l l main ta ining t iL e ava iL abili ty , 
cons iscency, a n d r: c n cur rency . l>lost systems i ncorpc Ta =:.ed a 
cli ent/sprvp:::, architec ture fo r c h e .1r part. :" ( 1)1 0:::' mode of 
ol)e:::,a::;~on . F i le rep l ica t. i o n eithpr the 
"worko" r~c, or the level. r ile t lInC s tamps 
were predomina l!t 1y used for f ~ l e reconc;i IJ. at ~ on . Al so, mos t 
sys tems i mp lementec a ccess contr-o l t h ro ugh f:'. le l ocking 
f iL e concu rrency . 
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After reviewing all cf the systems and associaLed 
services, we have ccncluded t hat. t he best system te prev:lde 
a ll o f th e desired qualit i es of a secure distri !y..:.tec. file 
sys tem :l S 'T'RUsted Ficus FiLE Sy s t em (TRU:OF LESI 
i mplementat i on. The re:3.son fo r th is that TEUFFLES 
incorpcrates all of the aforenentioned f e atu re s as '<Ie ll th e 
secu r ity enr.an cemen ts designed into tr.e cverall conf igurat :lon 
and not merely :3.dded after the s ystem was develcged . Alsc of 
importance is th e one copy availabil ity : e atU l"'e \>;hieh a :" l ov,'s 
fer (;omple t e data replicatien be promul got e d fr om one 
single (;Opy anyv,l; ere ·<li thin tr:e TRUFF LES net,,·;ork . 1'.. final, yet 
critical :"y important f eat.ne is t he ability of system 
admi nis t r a to rs t o a provided policy mod'..:.le Lc 
seamle ss l y (;OIltro:" t r:e lecal implement?-tien '.·J,ile ~ [i L. 
pI'C\' iding i n tegrct i cn th rcughout the entire sys ten. 
Tl":e Departmf"O t cf De:ense app2.icabi llty and pe t.cn tial 
usability ':' s O.ltstanding . One o f r.he main u ses ·"i _ l be t he 
sec u re e l ect r oni c t.!::"3.nsfer of unc l assified sens i t:':.ve (level 2) 
unc l ass ':' f ied non - sensit-ive (leve l 3) data fi le s. 
example, a large sensit :i.ve database (Censo l ida t ed Shlp's 
L:"sting (CCJSAL)) cou:"d be pTomu l ge.t ed updat e d 
in stan taneeus ly . Large group s cf date. (volumes: cec:ld a :" so "88 
tri)n ~ feTred ·,,'it l1 tl1e same ease as slng:"e fll e s l\n example of 
t his 'No u ld be the tran c;f er of 
an a viat i cn squ adrcn or a ship upen eslablishrr,ent. 
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;'.~though ther e are many justi f iable concerns s UIToun dlng 
seCU I'e or sensi t ive in f ormation ovc::: 
unt r us te:::l media , i t must I~ e understoo::l that o t 
the ':"nform3tion t r ansm i t t ed utili z ed ;"'it h i n th e ::JoD is of 
Leve l an d s e CU :::-l t y (sens i t i ,re/unc l ass i f ied and 
\..;H c las sitledj !'lith t hi s l eve l o t s ecuri t y e ncrypt lO ll 
schemes ensure adequ at e rity in an a l r e ?dy estab l L;he:::l 
f riend l y" fO llIldt. 
Certi fic ation managemen t and the dist r i b"Jt ion p ublic 
and private keys for a c,ymrnet r icil.l e:lc ryption and diglt a l 
signa tur e genera t i on are te c hno l ogica lly f ea5ib l e and re::;ruire 
o:lly ;;l roper' administrative controls t o b e estal;llshe d. 
The ideal wide area flle c.i s tr ib'Jt i on sys t em wou l d be t o 
i nco r :9ora t,e t he r epl ication, avai l ability a nd sec--.!rity 
teatures of TJLF?LE S into il. DoD wi de network , s u c h as the 
Di gital De: en5e Net',iC)rl,;: , ano to p r C)vl de t::>r l::>ca l systel'\ 
ad..--r.i n istratlon a Ild throug~'l. a fire ''''3 11 system, 
Kerbe:-os t :::-om prOJect Athena at M.I.T 'I'he firewa l l 
would provide tor l ocal s y s t em prol.ect ion a gainst int r "ll si OL 
trom n",cker s or l i mit a securily breech t o iJ l ocal 
area if :l1e sy s tem i s comp r om i sed , pr-ovide a locally gene r ated 
aud i t trai l , a nd prov i de ot a nelwo r \ ind eper.den t me tn od tor 
modl~ icatlon a nd ma inte na nc e o f the lecal s ystem 
7 h2 DoD shc uld a lso c.evelop re<; ::'oniJl k ey distri bc: t ion 
for l,;:ey gener-ation a nd cert i ficat e ma nagement 
? e giona l c2ilte:::-s will ;:;lrovide tlle same ber.e f its iJS a s i ngl e 
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2en t r alized certificate managem e nt fac i l ity :::ut l imi t the 
scope o f the damage and ea se of recov e IJi should a secur i t.y 
breech occur an d b ;:y g e nera t.ion be compro:J'l i sed. 
1'h e i 'Tlp lernen ta t.i on of TIS/PE!>1 at the Naval Pos t.gr a.duate 
Sc1"'.oo l procee ded in a cco r dan ce 1.,·it h the doc .. unen t a.t i on 
p r ov i ded Trusted In to rmation System; hO'.\iever one d~fficul t y 
',,'a s encounte r ed but e asily cor rect. e d . The actual u tilization 
of TI S / PEI1 can be accomp l i shed wi th litt le forma l t:::aining . 
The us ers manual i s c l e a r and con c i se . an d sys tem c orr.mands are 
l i mited to a minimum, users ',,, :'.. 11 become easi ly accustomed Lo 
i t s op e rat i ons an d u sahili t y for o;ec u re e-rnail . ? samp l e e -
mai l document with PEl-'i encryp t ion ic: in A?PENDIX B. 
1'he TRUF?LES sys t em ie, impleDent e d in the kerne l bf 
SvnOS ve rS lo n 4 . 1 . ,'ie deeI;le c. it impracti cal to ins t c'l. l l at t.he 
Naval Postgraduate Scho o l beccl"Jse o f the ant i q,lity of t he 
operating sys tem. The specif i c d i ffic u lLi ps of i mplementation 
revolved around t he installatio n of an old opera ting system on 
the NPS syst. eD 1dh ich h as had at l e as t 5 vpgradeG si n ce SunOs 
4 . 1. Fu ture of T?:"'F5" LES ,_"i l l 1:::e lnco r porJt e d in t.o 
Dore recent UNI X o;Jera ting :o;ystem ve r sions oond the n the 
i mp.1 ementat: i o n al NPS may be mo:::e p:::actical. vii th thi:o; 
researc h it is our :i ntenti.o') to not i fy Computer Cen ter 
managemen ::-. o f ~h e exis ::ence o f TRUFFLES, a n d t.o p l an for 
lmp :"..e:v e:""Lt c ticn 0.:0; scon the u pgrade a Doder r. o perating 
is made avai i a ble 
T:i<.UFE'LES arclli l_ectur e and the TIS/PEM reference 
i r:1p l <2:;,(.:l tat ion 'dG rk pyovicie t 
d i " t r ~Lt .. tion of fi les dnd r.hrectories ':"he inc lucnon of a 
fire v-.'a ll at t h e net 'dork s erve r f '--Ir t her enhances lhe 
of t::e local syste:l' . 2,,: urity fro lr. in tr:;.sion 
system ach-:linlstrators a n d in f ormation 
pro fessiona ls . The cornb in a llon of T?UEF : ,ES, TI S/PEN , a nd a 
t i re"<]odl syst em ·,vi ll provide the best coml::ana t i on fo r an 
.ln tegrated and de f endab le C":oIl'put er net"_'.'!or k 
The development of dist r ibu t ed f i .l e 
iIl t he netv,.'OrAed e nv i ronmen t ha s opene d 
arch i t- e c t ur e 
l n t eroperab i li t_y 
among ,_0 a more compl e x level . S ~mp l e f i le t rans f er , 
a basic el e me n t o f net ',,'orks, has b een ele';ateci to a seamless 
ani secu r e t rans f er: of fi les wi thoul requiring o r system 
ac.mi ni strc,tor ~ nput 'The ab illty t o c; e ncl large v olume s cf 
secure i nformat i on, :1ear l y ins tantane O'--Is l y, has hee n achieved, 
and t:-le syst e ms are ava i lab l e for DoD i mp lement-aeion. 
F u rt-he r incept_h study i s 
s uit6.bil i ty of e i s tribu t e:j f i le 
available concerning the 
,;"i t h vieeo multicas ts . 
prelininary iT,ve s tigation ~as Levealed t~a t d u d .l O is being 
e ncrypt_ed, but viieo i :nages h ave n o t been extensively 
e nct'ypted. A c:ue st i on toO aIl S',<]e r i s c an e nc yy pt-ion o f v ideo be 
co,,-,patibl e · ... it_ h ccnpreSS .l Oll algorith . '11S i s the 
'Th ere oe :-ler i ssues fo y f u r ther 
spec if ically , s pecif ieat J,On s h e t- e r ogeneous 
systems, o;eCllre tran SJ1'.'.-ss i on data ove rhead, amni::l.'.-,;t r ator 
·'icr:-<-l oad , security ce::-ci f ic3.t e issuance, in teraction ·", ~ th r:on -
systeI1's, I-Jor t ab .'.-l ::.- ty to other hardh'are and sottware 
plattonr s, and fi l e/volume reco,:c=-li"'tion tec hL.'.-ques . 
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Open Sys t em I n~e::::"(~o nnec:::i()n (051) model is a seven 
layer iJrotoco l mode l \-Ihose in ten t Lo c oo rdinat.e the desi g n 
of computer c OITh"rlun i rations architectur e and p.::ovide a 
:ra mework t or developlng proLo c ol s t andards. Briefly, 







I Data Link 
I Physical 
Figure 1 8 . 0.51 }18del 
File T.::a nsf er , ;;.ccess 2 nd l1an dgement ( FTlill) i o;; an OSI 
app l ication l aye r service \<lll i :::h p.::-ovides fo r access t o fore ig n 
fil e storage systems . Data Acc es.':l Protoco l (DAP) resides in 
the presenta t ion layer Flnc. is :'- n t he Ligito.l Ne ':- 'Nor k 
!'l.rch itecture to provide for f u r.c t ional i ty i n e xcllang.ln:;J dilto. 
:Oet'-,'ee:c two ne t 'Nc r k noces . F ile T:::-ansfer Protoco l (FTP) is om 
I nt e r net standard a pplica t ion layer p r otocol ~esigLed for 
tran sf. e rring file s fron one com:;Juter to "'TIother. S i mple Mail 
Transfer F-::-GtQcol i s an I nternet star.da r e protoco l used 
fo r c: r ansf e rring elec~_ron i c ma il mEssages f rom one compute r t o 
a::1o the r . I t s;:>ecifies how E- ma i l It.' i ll i nter-act and t he c cntr8 1 
fOLnat me:::;sage s ey.ch c~nged t o transE e r ma~l. 
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Host o f these p::-otocols a::-e co l l e ctl.ve ly na::ne d under 
Transmi sSlOf! Cont:::-ol Pro toco l / Interne t Protocol (TCP/ IP) wn~ch 
refers to a group of application and transport ;:Jrotocols usee. 
'd~ th':n the Int ernet . These i nclude FTP ", nc. SH'IP 
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ENCRYPTED PEM MESSAGE 
Example of an Encapsulated ENCRYPTED PEM Message 
Key - In f o: 
1 02 
----- END PRTW.cY - BNJiA.."\'CED MESSAGE -
L e g e nd f or PEM message:" ' 
Linn , J Req'Jest: :01::' Comments: 1 4 2l , 
2 3 - 3 0 " 
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APPENDI X C : ACQUIRI NG TIS/PEM'" 
TIS/?El<1 , a reference i mp l e menta t-i on of Privacy Enhanced 
Hail {rC~l) i s a vai lab l e [or b r oad use a n cS. prov i ded by ?SA Da ta 
Securl.ty , Inc. and TrusLe c. In[ormat i on Systems, In~ _ IL is 
distribute d in sour:::e form, Itii th al l modules ',.;r1.tten i n 
C programming l anguage. 'T'IS/PE;"( runs o n most UNI X p laLtorms 
a:1d i s in tegra ted 'with the f ol lu,..' i;-:g use r in ter[aces: VerSlc n 
6 .7 o[ the Rand HH Message Hanc.ling system , Xrr,r-; , and I'lH uncer 
Emacs . Fi l ters are pro \'ide cS. Itlork ,-<,lith ct-her r.1essage 
handling sys t ems . 
The :Eai n cryptogra phy packag e supp l ie::i 
Securi t y, Tnc. is t he RSAREF. This package licens ed to only 
be use::i with TIS/PEl1 on l y ,,"ithin t he United States and 
Canada . 
The sOurce code :or TIS/PEM is found in a blind cirecLory 
an::i i t. i s a z ipped tar f ile (p-5.- . tiH . Z). These a re the steps 
Le duwn l cad the source c od e anc, documenLation . 
PT'P t- o ttp. t is.com. 
Go te the dire c tory pub/ PEM anc dC'tm l cad the REJl.0I1E f i le 
yeu as t o 
d i :::ectc r y ' n 'cn~'wn 
Information Systems , Inc . , TIS /PEK User' s Guide , 
Oc tober 
=-- 04 
lIdc.i :iona l i nfonna tion l-egar d i nq supp or t co t TI S / PE: H can b", 
v ia t h e user 's group 
<tiapem-us ers@tis.com:> . 
To j o in 5end e mail to 
<tispem-users -request@tis.com> 
2.n o. to ;:;e added t o t h e d l sl ribut i on l i s t . 
Fo r techn i c a l c;: U(." ~; t ion s send e-n:a il to 
<tispem-support@tis.com>_ 
F~l l: cer t l f ica:_c regi s t rat ~ on i nformati o n s end e-mai 1 
<tispca-inio@tis.com> or <pca -info@rs a .com> . 
Sen d corre spondence t o 'T' I S aL: 
'Trust e e I nformation Systems 
3060 Road (8:. 97 ) 
Glen':JOod, Ha ryland 2 1 7 38 
1 0 5 
Arno l d , N. UNIX Sccl;~itv : A P~actical Tutoric.l, McGra'",' -
Clill, Inc . 1 993 . 
"A Netwo:::- k Fe::::imeter wit h 
Trustee.. In fo rmation Sys t e ms, 1:1::, 
Coh e n, D "A?S : NFS on Steroids·, r JVl Technology , 
:"993. 
1(ellIler , 
] 991 . 





tor Comput er Nen,;or !< s " 
F i ordan, l>l. Users Guide : tor ?IPEM 
J a nuary 1994 . 
S c hnei.e r, Bnl c e , "Dig i t al Signalures ' , 
Nove:'wer 1 99 3. 
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